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During an infectious disease outbreak, biases in the data and complexities of the under-
lying dynamics pose significant challenges in mathematically modelling the outbreak and
designing policy. Motivated by the ongoing response to COVID-19, we provide a toolkit of
statistical and mathematical models beyond the simple SIR-type differential equation
models for analysing the early stages of an outbreak and assessing interventions. In
particular, we focus on parameter estimation in the presence of known biases in the data,
and the effect of non-pharmaceutical interventions in enclosed subpopulations, such as
households and care homes. We illustrate these methods by applying them to the COVID-
19 pandemic.
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Mathematical epidemiology is a well-developed field. Since the pioneering work of Ross in malaria modelling (Ross, 1910)
and Kermack andMcKendrick’s general epidemic models (Kermack&McKendrick, 1927), there has been gathering interest in
using mathematical tools to investigate infectious diseases. The allure is clear, since mathematical models can provide
powerful insight into how these complex systems behave, which in turn can enable these problems to be better controlled/
prevented.
Not only is the power of the mathematical tools increasing, but the availability of data on infectious diseases, whether this
be a rapid release of data during an outbreak or detailed collection of data for endemic pathogens, is increasing. Rapid
interpretation of epidemiological data is critical for the development of effective containment, suppression and mitigation
interventions, but there are many difficulties to interpreting case data in real-time. These include interpreting symptom
progression and fatality ratios with delay distributions and right-censoring, exacerbated by exponential growth in cases
leading to the majority of case data being on recently infected individuals; lack of clarity and consistency in denominators;
inconsistency of case definitions over time and the eventual impact of interventions and changes to behaviour on trans-
mission dynamics. Mathematical and statistical techniques can help overcome some of these challenges to interpretation,
aiding in the development of intervention strategies and management of care. Examining key epidemiological quantities
alongside each other in a transmissionmodel can provide quantitative insights into the outbreak, testing the potential impact
of intervention strategies and predicting the risk posed to the human (or animal) host population and healthcare
preparedness.
Mathematical modelling has been used as part of the planning process during outbreak response by governments
worldwide for many recent outbreaks. For example the UK Department of Health has a long established committee Scientific
Pandemic Influenza group on Modelling, or SPI-M to advise on new and emerging respiratory infections (Department of
Health and Social Care, 2018). One of the largest instances of such an outbreak in recent history was the 2009 H1N1
pandemic. The World Health Organisation developed a network of modelling groups and public health experts to work on
exploring various characteristic of the outbreak (Biggerstaff et al., 2020; Van Kerkhove & Ferguson, 2012). These ranged from
characterising the dynamics of the outbreak to investigating the effectiveness of different intervention strategies. This
integration of mathematics into policy design indicates the important insights that modelling and statistics can provide.
This paper is a collection of work-streams addressing various technical questions faced by the group as part of the ongoing
response to COVID-19, and as such is written to be reflective of the experience we have gone and are currently going through.
Therefore, to aid the reader each section includes results and a short discussion. Many of the questions and techniques
presented here can be further developed as the availability of data and research interests evolves, but are compiled into this
manuscript as an overview of methodology and scientific approaches beyond the standard SIR textbook model that benefit
the ongoing efforts in tackling this and other outbreaks.1.1. COVID-19 pandemic background
First documented in December 2019, an outbreak of community-acquired pneumonia began in Wuhan, Hubei Province,
China. In January, this outbreak was attributed to a novel coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2. The initial spread of the pathogen in
Wuhanwas fast, and after a period of case-finding and contact tracing, China moved to implement a ‘shutdown’ of Wuhan on
January 23, and other cities in China the following days, to try to suppress the growth of the epidemic. These measures may
have succeeded at slowing down the rate at which cases have been seeded elsewhere, but in many countries initial
importation of cases and transmission has not been contained. Countries around the world are now seeing outbreaks that are
overwhelming, or have the potential to overwhelm, healthcare systems and cause a high number of deaths even in high-
income countries (Remuzzi & Remuzzi, 2020).
While the majority of documented symptomatic cases are mild, characterised in many reports by a persistent cough and
fever, a significant proportion of these individuals go on to develop pneumonia, with some then developing acute respiratory
failure and a small proportion of overall cases becoming fatal. Severity of symptoms has been observed to increase with age
and with the presence of underlying health conditions such as diabetes (Fang, Karakiulakis, & Roth, 2020) and cardiac
conditions, with some evidence that severity of symptoms might depend on gender and ethnicity (Guan et al., 2020; Rimmer,
2020; Wu et al., 2020; Wu & McGoogan, 2020; Zhou et al., 2020).
SARS-CoV-2 has a fast doubling time (the time it takes for the number of cases in the region to double, estimated at
approximately 3 days (Pellis et al., 2020) and, potentially, a very large R0 (the average number of infections caused by each
infected individual, with estimates ranging from 1.4 to 6.47 (Liu, Gayle, Wilder-Smith, & Rockl€ov, 2020; Mahase, 2020;
Majumder&Mandl, 2020 ;World Health Organisation, 2020)). It is possible that there is a significant degree of asymptomatic
and/or pre-symptomatic transmission (Li et al., 2020; Mizumoto, Kagaya, Zarebski, & Chowell, 2020; Nishiura et al., 2020),
though without robust serosurveys, this is difficult to quantify with certainty. These characteristics result in the pathogen
being able to spread widely, rapidly and undetected, presenting a significant risk to public health.
Typically, the aim of an intervention strategy would be to push and keep the reproduction number Rt, defined as the
average number of cases generated by a typical infective at time t, below 1. At this point each infected individual subsequently
infects, on average, less than one individual, such that the number of cases should decline. The basic reproduction number, R0,
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susceptible.
High R0, fast growth, and possible pre- or asymptomatic infection make the design of potential interventions, and the
modelling that would inform them, particularly challenging. Large values of R0 mean a substantial amount of transmission
needs to be halted; fast growth causes the number of cases in the absence of interventions to rise rapidly, so that the time
scale of interventions to reduce R0 must also be fast in order to effect substantive early changes on a population level; finally,
the resulting interventions must encompass possible pre- and asymptomatic cases, a challenging prospect when in many
instances these individuals are indistinguishable from healthy individuals. Consequently, we must consider the possibility of
interventions that are massively disruptive to society and may have to be sustained for a long period of time in order to cause
the number of infections to decline towards zero (Ferguson et al., 2020). If infections remain, and the susceptible proportion of
the population remains above the herd immunity threshold, these interventions must be upheld to prevent a second wave of
the epidemic. There is not yet conclusive evidence as to the degree and duration of immunity conferred by infection with
SARS-CoV-2 nor the feasibility of a vaccine, the timeline for which is unlikely to be any time shorter than 18 months away at
the time of writing (Jack, 2020). Therefore, short term extreme interventions are not as effective as they might be in other
circumstances, since after their removal there remains a long period of time in which cases can rise again. The longer these
significantly suppressive and disruptive interventions are in effect, the more severe the effect on the economy, and broader
societal health and well-being. Furthermore, adherence to interventions will likely vary with their duration and severity.
We are further challenged by the lack of transferable intuition. Early work looked at intuition gained from SARS and MERS
outbreaks, also caused by coronaviruses. Some parameters do appear to be similar to these pathogens, such as the average
length of the incubation period (Lauer et al., 2020; Varia et al., 2003; Virlogeux, Fang, Park, Wu, & Cowling, 2016). However,
there are also clear differences, with both SARS and MERS being more fatal, but seemingly less efficient at spreading since
they did not seed major global pandemics. Another complication is the spread of the infection during the Chinese Spring
Festival, a time period during which movement, social, and contact patterns vary significantly. This presents significant
challenges as experience and intuition from other studies regarding population mixing and spatial patterns must either be
modified or are invalid. Furthermore, the pandemic has received a proportionately larger level of public attention than e.g. the
2009 H1N1 pandemic (Chew& Eysenbach, 2009; Rubin, Amlôt, Page, &Wessely, 2009), largely boosted by social media. This
greater level of public awareness, and the successive, staggered interventions placed to prevent disease spread are respon-
sible for significant variations in behaviour (Butler, 2014; Funk, Gilad, Watkins, & Jansen, 2009) and adherence to public
guidance both in China and abroad.
The structure of this paper follows two main themes. In Section 2, we discuss various biases that are present in outbreak
data and techniques for estimating epidemiological parameters. Accounting for biases and producing robust parameter es-
timates is important throughout the duration of an epidemic, both for increasing our understanding of the underlying dy-
namics, and for feeding into models. Firstly, we discuss a bias-corrected method for estimating the incubation period, which
can also be applied to serial intervals, onset-to-death time, and other delay distributions. We then present a method for
estimating the true growth rate of the epidemic, accounting for the bias encountered since infected individuals may be
exported from the region. Our next method is a tool for estimating the expected size of the next generation of infectives based
on the rate of observed cases. This tool provides insight into the size of small outbreaks, which can inform decision making
when trying to prevent a major outbreak taking off.
In Section 3, we propose a variety of mathematical models looking at disease impact and intervention strategies, with
particular focus on non-pharmaceutical interventions due to the current lack of widely deployable, targeted pharmaceutical
treatments. These models focus on enclosed populations, since this is the level at whichmost interventions are implemented.
Since the disease is particularly fatal in the elderly and other at-risk groups, we develop a care homemodel to investigate how
the pathogen may spread through care homes. We also develop household models to investigate the impact of different
intervention/control strategies. These models can inform policy design for mitigating or controlling epidemic spread. Finally,
in the context of relaxing strong social distancing policies, we investigate the extinction probability of the pathogen. We first
consider the extinction probability after lifting restrictions. We then develop a household-based contact tracing model, with
which we investigate the extinction probability under weaker isolation policies paired with contact tracing, thus shedding
light on possible combinations of interventions that allow us to feasibly manage the infection while minimising the social
impact of control policies.
2. Biases and estimation during outbreaks
2.1. Potential biases in the outbreak data
Techniques are constantly developing that enable higher volumes of more accurate data to be collected real-time during
an epidemic. These data present a large opportunity for analysis to gain insight into the pathogen and the dynamics of the
outbreak. However, although the quality of the data is constantly increasing, there are still many biases present. Some of these
are due to the data collectionmethods, and in an ideal world wewould be able to eliminate them, and some are simply due to
the nature of the outbreak, and will be present regardless of data collection methods.
During an outbreak, many parameters depend on delay distributions (the length of time between two events), such as the
time from infection to symptom onset (the incubation period). If an individual can be followed indefinitely, it is easy to
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the data is subject to censoring and truncation issues. In the incubation period, for example, censoring comes into play since, if
we have observed an infection but the individual has not yet developed symptoms, we only have a lower bound on how long
it will take them to develop symptoms. To account for this, we can instead condition on observing symptom onset before the
cut-off date. However, this leads to a truncation issue, since individuals who were infected close to the cut-off date will only
be observed if they have a short incubation period, which leads to an overexpression of short delays.
The number of cases tends to grow exponentially during the early stages of an outbreak, causing the force of infection and
the number of reported cases to increase with time. This further complicates the truncation issue since not only are recent
cases truncated but they also account for the majority of cases. The growing force of infection also needs to be accounted for,
since if the potential time of infection is interval-censored rather than observed directly, the probability that the case was
infected in each day of that interval is not constant.
In theory, both of these biases are relatively straightforward to account for. In practice however, there are other biases in
the data. One of the major biases is the reporting rate. Although the total number of cases may be reasonably described as
growing exponentially with a constant rate in the early stages of an outbreak, high-resolution data may exhibit more complex
behaviour. This can be due to a variety of reasons, such as the workload becoming overwhelming, the availability of
individual-level data decreasing, the laboratories or offices slowing down activity over the weekend, the case definition
changing, the testing capabilities increasing, and so on.
Another uncertainty arises since generally only the date of each event is recorded rather than the time. This presents a
large window of uncertainty in the length of the delay, since the time of each event can vary up to 24 h, and for a delay
distribution, which depend on two events, it could vary by up to 48 h.
Travel rate is another bias present in the data. For example, this changes the density of observed cases in a region, which
can change the apparent growth rate. Intervention strategies present a further bias because this can change the growth rate of
the epidemic and the reporting rate. Additionally, estimates of certain parameters may vary depending on the interventions
that are implemented, so these need to be considered carefully.
2.2. Incubation period
To model the incubation period, we require information regarding when an individual was infected and when they
expressed symptoms. Observing exact time of infection is unlikely, but it can be possible to find potential exposure windows.
We consider three different data sets. The first two consist of individuals who travelled from Wuhan before expressing
symptoms. We can assume these individuals were infected in Wuhan, since at the time of this data, the force of infectionwas
significantly higher inWuhan than elsewhere. The length of time spent inWuhan therefore provides awindow during which
each individual became infected, and for many of these individuals we also have the date of symptom onset. In the early
stages, the growth rate in reported cases was constant, and dependent on the epidemic growth rate in Wuhan and the rate at
which people left Wuhan. By using travel to estimate the true number of cases, we estimate the exponential growth rate in
Wuhan as r ¼ 0:25 (see Section 2.3). Therefore, the force of infection on day i, gðiÞ, is proportional to e0:25i. After 23 January
when significant travel bans were introduced, the rate at which individuals left Wuhan diminished significantly, causing the
reporting rate for our sample dataset to suddenly drop. This occurs since cases are only included if we have a fixed window of
time spent in Wuhan prior to developing symptoms. Therefore, if the data is truncated after 23 January, the reporting rate
must be appropriately adjusted. This is illustrated in Fig. 1a. The difference between these two datasets is the truncation date,
with the first truncated at 20 January and the second at 9 February. The third dataset contains cases that were infected
through a discrete infection event, such as spending time with a known infected case. In this ‘‘non-Wuhan” dataset, the
reporting rate is constant and the force of infection can be assumed constant over each exposure window. The source we use
for these three data sets is a publicly available line-list (Sun, Chen, & Viboud, 2020).
Incubation periods, and many other delay distributions, are generally observed to have right skewed distributions. We
therefore choose to use a Gamma distribution, though other distributions can also be applied using the proposed methods,
such as Weibull and Log-normal. To fit the data, we use maximum likelihood estimation. To adjust for the biases we use a
‘‘forwards’’ approach (Nishiura, 2010; Scalia Tomba, Svensson, Asikainen, & Giesecke, 2010; Sun, 1995; Svensson, 2007),
where we condition on the time of the first event, time of exposure, and find the distribution looking forward to the second
event, time of symptom onset. For a data point fai;bi;yig, where infection occurs between ai and bi, and yi is the symptom
onset date, the likelihood function is given by
Lðyijai; bi; qÞ¼
Z b
a
gðiÞfqðyi  iÞdiZ b
a
Z Ti
0
gðiÞfqðxÞdxdi
;
where gð ,Þ is the density function of the infection date and fqð ,Þ is the density function of the incubation period para-
meterised by q. From this, the likelihood function for our dataset X is given by
Fig. 1. Reporting rate (a) and maximum likelihood distributions (b) for the COVID-19 incubation period.
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ðai∩biÞ; qÞ¼
Y
i
Lðyijai; bi; qÞ:This approach is independent of the reporting rate bias, since the reporting rate depends on the date an individual leaves
Wuhan (bi), which is conditioned against (see Appendix A). We use the mean and standard deviation to characterise the MLE.
Since the tail of the incubation period is important when designing quarantine strategies, we then calculate the probability
that the incubation period is longer than 14 days and find the minimum day by which 99% of cases will have expressed
symptoms (excluding true asymptomatic cases). We also investigate the reporting date uncertainty mentioned in Section 2.1
by considering the different extremes that the data could represent. This is achieved through adding or subtracting a day to all
recorded data.
Methods accounting for truncation and growth biases in epidemic data have been discussed widely in the literature
(Kalbfleisch & Lawless, 1991; Nishiura, 2010; Su & Wang, 2012; Taylor, Weaver, & Roddy, 2003), however there are fewer
applications to outbreaks (Farewell, Herzberg, James, Ho, & Leung, 2005). In the context of COVID-19, estimates have
considered growing force of infection, for example (Lauer et al., 2020), and some approaches have considered truncation, for
example (Linton et al., 2020). However, these attempts do not adjust for the reporting rate in the data or use the correct force
of infection, causing the incubation period to be overestimated. Although the method presented here is independent of the
reporting rate, other approaches for estimating the incubation period are not.
2.2.1. Truncation
Herewe demonstrate the importance of truncation (Table 1). We use the data truncated at 20 January, which has exposure
windows between 1 December and 19 January. This data set is chosen since it is most sensitive to truncation due to the
exponentially growing force of infection and high reporting rate. Without accounting for truncation, the length of the in-
cubation period is significantly underestimated, which could have a large impact on the success of intervention strategies.
2.2.2. Different data sets
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the bias correctionmethod, we compare three different data sets (Table 2). The similar
distributions predicted across these datasets suggests a robust method. Fig. 1b compares the full distributions for these three
estimates.
2.2.3. Reporting date uncertainty
Here we investigate the effect that uncertainty in the reporting date can have on the results, using the data truncated at 9
February (Table 3). The standard interval is the recorded data, wide intervals are obtained by removing a day from the
Table 1
Effect of accounting for truncation on the incubation period.
Method Mean Standard deviation 14 day risk 99% confidence date Sample size
Uncorrected 3.49 2.05 0.00060 10 65
Truncation corrected 4.69 2.78 0.0075 14 65
Table 2
Effect of different data sets on the incubation period.
Method Mean Standard deviation 14 day risk 99% confidence date Sample size
Wuhan - January 20, 2020 4.69 2.78 0.0075 14 65
Wuhan - February 09, 2020 4.84 2.79 0.0081 14 162
Non-Wuhan 4.84 3.22 0.016 16 52
Table 3
Effect of uncertainty in the reporting date on the incubation period.
Method Mean Standard deviation 14 day risk 99% confidence date Sample size
Standard Intervals 4.84 2.79 0.0081 14 162
Wide Intervals 4.21 2.56 0.0041 13 162
Narrow Intervals 5.55 2.86 0.0112 15 162
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the reporting date can impact the estimated incubation period, showing that it is important to consider this risk when
designing interventions.
2.2.4. Implications
When constructing intervention strategies for an epidemic, the incubation period is an important parameter. For example,
consider the quarantine strategy deployed in many countries during the early stages of the epidemic, aimed at preventing
cases being imported fromWuhan. This strategy quarantined individuals upon their return fromWuhan for 14 days. For such
a strategy to be effective, we require most incubation periods to be less than 14 days, so that the majority of infected people
would develop symptoms before quarantine ended, enabling them to be further isolated. In this analysis, we show that in the
worst-case scenario we would expect 1 in 62 cases to slip through this quarantine, with the best fit predicting 1 in 101 cases.
Therefore, the 14 day quarantine period would capture the majority of cases. Throughout the epidemic, this seems to have
been reasonably successful and prevented early seeding of cases in many countries. However, potentially due to complicated
travel patterns or asymptomatic transmission, cases have slipped through detection and not been quarantined, which un-
fortunately has led to the situation observed today.
In addition to the incubation period, there are many other delay distributions that must be estimated while an epidemic is
growing, which can be estimated using the same technique. These include the generation time, the time between two
infection events in a transmission chain; the serial interval, the time between symptom onset of an infector to their infectee;
and the onset-to-death delay, the time from symptom onset to death.
2.3. Transportation modelling and under-reporting
Transportationmodelling plays a crucial role in the early stages of an outbreak; an infected individual may travel outside of
the region in which they were originally infected and seed further infections across geographical scales which are impossible
to contain. Furthermore, as the rate of travelling increases, the number of observed cases within the known ‘‘origin” region
decreases, and if exportation is not taken into account this results in an underestimation of the number of cases. These
underestimates can be improved by looking at the total number of cases across all known affected regions, but doing so
introduces further complications. For example, if an individual has less severe symptoms they may not seek medical assis-
tance, thereby not being recorded as a case at their destination. This underestimation of cases can have significant effects if
the traveller is able to infect more people. A new transmission chain can thus be started which remains undetected for some
time due to a lacking known connection to the ‘‘origin” region.
In the ‘‘origin” region an individual with mild symptoms may still be tested for an infection due to a higher level of
alertness in the local health care system. However, this level of active case-finding may not be present elsewhere, or may not
have been allocated a comparable level of resources. Further complications to this model arise from the incubation period of
individuals wherein detection is unlikely, and the variations in movement and mixing between people when preventative
measures are put in place.
We consider a metapopulation model seeded with an infection in one of the regions, O, and investigate how exportation
from this region combined with variability in case-finding can alter estimates for the doubling time and the expected portion
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to target for personal intervention (e.g. quarantine or treatment). Note that the proportion of identified cases need not
necessarily correlate with the proportion of the infected population who exhibit symptoms.
Let us assume that movement from O begins at time t ¼ tc, and occurs with a constant rate r; this can be thought of as the
surge in travel in China during the beginning of the Spring Festival. In the early phase of an epidemic, we can assume the
incidence IðtÞ ¼ I0ert of cases to be growing exponentially with a rate r. The number of cases at time t which were infected a
time t ago is denoted by iðt;tÞ, where the probability of detecting a case that infected a host a time t ago is given by pðt;tincÞ.
This probability depends on the incubation period tinc of the infection, and is decomposed into a detection probability
f ðt; tincÞ after some time twhich may also depend on the individual’s incubation period, and the probability density function
of said incubation period, gðtincÞ. Hence, pðt; tincÞ ¼ f ðt; tincÞgðtincÞ such that the number of observed cases in O is given by
COðtÞ¼ I0erðttcÞQðttcÞ
Zt
0
gðtincÞ
Zt
0
erðttÞf ðt; tincÞdtdtinc;
whereQð ,Þ is the Heaviside step function, andwe have assumed that recovery of cases is negligible over the time scale of case
observations. If we consider travel to i other regions from O, the total number of observed cases in all destinations is
CDðtÞ¼
X
isO
CiðtÞ¼uCOðtÞ

erðttcÞQðttcÞ 1;
where u is the mean case-finding ability across all destinations. In the presence of real-time transition probabilities pij of
moving between two regions, these estimates can be further elaborated.
We assume that detection occurs immediately following the end of the incubation period, i.e. f ðt; tincÞ ¼ Qðt  tincÞ.
Similarly, we assume a gamma-distributed incubation period gðtincÞ ¼ 1GðkÞqkt
k1
inc e
tinc=q with shape and scale parameters k
and q, respectively. We can parametrise this distribution using the ‘‘non-Wuhan” estimate of the incubation period in Table 2,
which yields a gamma-distribution with mean 4.84 and standard deviation 3.22. In contrast to other values in the table, this
estimate is obtained from discrete infection events, e.g. contact with a known infected case, and therefore has a constant
reporting rate, and a constant force of infection over each exposurewindow. Therefore, this estimate of the incubation period
does not rely on the exponential growth rate unlike other estimates from Section 2.2.
Historic estimates for Chinese travel data indicate a mean travel rate from Hubei province of r ¼ 0:029 which began on
January 10 (Keju, 2019; Morris). Using the above incubation period, this suggests a rate r ¼ 0:22±0:01 when ignoring travel
exportation, in contrast to r ¼ 0:25±0:01 when accounting for r. This difference may seem small, but it reduces the doubling
time by approximately 12 h. The expected value of r grows linearly with the exportation rate, which has also been observed
with real-time travel models (Kraemer et al., 2020). Further models have also been developed which consider travel and
exportation of cases in greater detail (Chinazzi et al., 2020; Gostic, Gomez, Mummah, Kucharski, & Lloyd-Smith, 2020).
The relationship between the observed cases in our origin and destinations can be used to determine the case-finding
ability, though it should be noted that u likely varies with time as burdens are increased on public services and the num-
ber of cases grow. Early estimates using data from (Recorded daily case updat, 2020) indicate at most an 80% case-finding
ability, suggesting thousands of undetected cases exported to other regions of China, a sufficient quantity to sustain
further transmission post-exportation independently of the number of asymptomatic cases present.
The intention of these estimates is not to provide specific values for the doubling time of the spread of COVID-19 in China
(as the estimates above use historic travel data and are limited by the availability of data), but to bring attention to the unusual
circumstances surrounding changes in contact patterns, and mobility during the Chinese Spring Festival, the largest human
migration on Earth (Keju, 2019). Failing to account for the significant level of dispersion or exportation of cases during these
circumstances will significantly skew our estimates.2.4. Estimating the size of the first generation from the observed number of symptomatic individuals
In a scenario where a single individual exposes a group to infection, it can be unclear howmany people have been infected
since they do not immediately develop symptoms. However, knowing the true prevalence in the population is essential to
determine the most effective interventions to put in place, and to estimate future burdens on public services. Using the
probability density function of the incubation period, we consider the efficacy of using the time it takes for people to present
with symptoms as a predictor for the size of the infected group. This analysis is an effective ready reckoner at early stages of a
novel infection, or in close contact environments, and is useful for predicting generation size when a complete data set is not
yet available. In this analysis we focus on a scenario where infection time is known. In reality, wemay only know an exposure
window. For short exposurewindows thismethod can still be valid, but for longer exposurewindows it will need extending to
account for this added uncertainty.
We assume that the number of individuals who have been exposed to potential infection is known, in which case the
number of people who are infected can be assumed to be binomially distributed with an unknown probability P that each
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the number of individuals who have expressed symptoms. This yields two cases. In the first case, we assume that the true
number of symptomatic individuals are observed. In the second case, we take the number of observed symptomatic in-
dividuals as a lower bound on the true value.
We wish to determine the probability that the first generation has e0 individuals, E0 ¼ e0, given that it symptomatic
individuals are observed on day t, It ¼ it. This is given by (see Appendix B)
PðE0 ¼ eojIt ¼ itÞ¼
e0!
ðe0  itÞ!
ð1 FðtÞÞe0  ð1 FðtÞÞ
it ðn itÞ!ðit þ 1Þ
ðnþ 1Þ!2F1ðit þ 1; it  n; it þ 2; FðtÞÞ
:
This gives a distribution of the generation-size based on the number of observed symptomatic individuals by time t. We
can extend it to investigate a scenario where no symptomatic individuals have been observed by time t by using a value of
0 for It:
PðE0 ¼ e0jIt ¼0Þ¼
ð1 FðtÞÞe0
ðnþ 1Þ2F1ð1;n;2; FðtÞÞThis can be used to illustrate worst and best case scenarios given t time has passed without symptomatic individuals.
Additionally, if we consider the probability that E0 ¼ 0, we can find the value of t where we can have a 95% confidence that
there will not be a second generation:
PðE0 ¼0jIt ¼0Þ¼
1
ðnþ 1Þ2F1ð1;n;2; FðtÞÞ
>0:95This analysis considers the case when the number of observed symptomatic individuals to date is the true number. In
practice however, we do not generally observe every symptomatic individual, so the number of observations is only a lower
bound on the true number. To address this, rather than considering It as the total number of people who have developed
symptoms by time t, we can define ~It as the minimum number of people who have developed symptoms by time t. We
assume that the probability that~It is equal to~it for a given value of it is uniform at 1itþ1. We can then use the same methods as
above to infer a distribution for P. Details are provided in Appendix C.
As we can see from Fig. 2, this method can be used to predict the number of infected individuals in the original exposed
group. However, we have also demonstrated the importance of caution when interpreting this data. If there is uncertainty
surrounding the presentation of symptomatic patients, using ~It as a lower bound is a robust method to ensure the size of the
generation is not underestimated.
3. Modelling intervention strategies
3.1. Adherence
When designing intervention strategies, we need to consider how adherence may alter their effectiveness. This is
important, since highly effective interventions may not be adhered to if they present great individual cost to a population. In
this case, a theoretically less effective intervention may perform better, if it has sufficient reduction in individual-level cost. In
this section, we illustrate the potential impacts of adherence on the effectiveness of interventions using a toy model.
Consider a standard SIR model, and denote by SðtÞ and RðtÞ, respectively, the susceptible and recovered/immune fractions
of the population at time t. We can write S in terms of R such that
SðtÞ¼ Sð0ÞexpðR0RðtÞÞ
and let t/∞ to get the final size formula
1Rð∞Þ¼ Sð0ÞexpðR0Rð∞ÞÞ;
where Rð∞Þ is the fraction of cases at end of outbreak in the absence of behavioural change (Brauer, 2019). This gives a ready
reckoner for the eventual attack rate if interventions are not put in place or come in too late to be effective. To illustrate, if we
have R0 ¼ 3 (and Sð0Þz1), then Rð∞Þ ¼ 0:94. If an intervention is put in place that reduces (with full adherence) R0 < 1 then
the outbreak will be controlled. Indeed, let us assume that R0 is reduced to zero by the intervention: for example, assume that
social distancing is perfect and the number of contacts of a fully-adherent individual is zero. If only 50% of people adhere to
the intervention then the average number of contacts is effectively reduced by a half and logically Ry0 ¼ R0=2 ¼ 1:5 (the y
representing quantities post intervention) and Rð∞Þy ¼ 0:58 in this case. However, this assumes that adherence is an inde-
pendent random process at each contact. This suggests that for each contact an individual would ordinarily make, they ‘‘toss a
coin” to decide whether to isolate or not. In reality, individuals are more likely to show polarity, where some individuals
Fig. 2. Prediction of the size of the first generation, e0, in an infection event in which 20 people were exposed. A, B and C show the density when the number of
observed symptomatics is taken to be the true number of symptomatics, D, E and F consider the case where the observed symptomatics is a lower bound on the
true symptomatics. A and D consider the case when zero symptomatics are observed after 5 days, B and E when 5 are observed after 5 days, and C and F when 5
are observed after 10 days. The incubation period for the disease has been modelled as a gamma distribution with a mean of 4.84 and standard deviation of 2.79
(Table 2).
C.E. Overton et al. / Infectious Disease Modelling 5 (2020) 409e441 417reduce all their contacts and follow the measures and a proportion of individuals choose to not adhere to the intervention. If
there was distinct polarity in the population such that 50% adhered perfectly and 50% ignored policy, then a toy model can be
created with two infectious groups, IA and IB, that behave differently. In this case
_S¼  ðRAIA þRBIBÞS;
_IA ¼4ðRAIA þRBIBÞS IA;
_IB ¼ð14ÞðRAIA þRBIBÞS IB;
where a dot over a variable represents its time derivative. Such an epidemic model, where the two groups have the same
susceptibility but different infectivity, has the same final size as an epidemic in a single-type model with the same R0 (e.g. see
(Andreasen, 2011)). However, they have different durations as can be seen in Fig. 3, where 4 ¼ 1=2, RB ¼ 0 and RA ¼ 3. This
shows that the assumptions about the nature of adherence predict the same growth rate and final size, but that the more
polarised adherence has faster early growth and therefore an earlier peak.
More complicated model structures could be constructed by incorporating adherence with intervention by susceptible
states, which would lead to core group dynamics (see for example (Keeling& Rohani, 2011)). This issue of independent versus
polarised adherence is related to the idea of all-or-nothing versus leaky vaccination (Goldstein et al., 2009; Magpantay, Riolo,
Domenech de Celles, King, & Rohani, 2014), where you either vaccinate a fraction of the population with 100% efficacy or
vaccinate 100% of the populationwith reduced efficacy (House & Keeling, 2011). Note however that vaccination reduces your
susceptibility (whether only or also), rather than only your infectivity as in the model discussed above, and variation in
Fig. 3. Comparing the different definitions of adherence. The left panel shows the people in I state from SIRmodel (red) and from IA state plus the IB state in SIAIBR
model (black), with the same overall mean level of adherence. The resulting recovered curves are in the middle panel, with the right panel showing the recovered
cases on log scale.
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final size than full coverage with a leaky vaccine (all individuals having the same mean susceptibility).
3.2. Care home model
The ongoing COVID-19 outbreak is known to have higher mortality rates amongst the elderly, the immunocompromised
and those with respiratory and health complications (Guan et al., 2020; Wu et al., 2020; Wu & McGoogan, 2020; Yang et al.,
2020; Zhou et al., 2020). In this section, wemodel the introduction of an infectious disease into care homes, in order to obtain
estimates of the final size of the epidemic in the vulnerable population as well as predictions for the number of hospital-
isations and fatalities.
Modelling of care homes in the UK is conducted against the backdrop of awider epidemic in the general population, which
we here assume to be following SEIR dynamics with a basic reproduction number R0 that might be different from the within-
care home reproduction number RC.
Care homes are assumed to be closed populations, with the infection entering each of them independently with a certain
probability. Infection is seeded only once, and within-care home outbreaks then evolve independently from, and do not
contribute to, other care home outbreaks and the epidemic in the background population. To keep track of hospitalisations,
we model the within-care home infection dynamics using a compartmental model that, in addition to SEIR model, has
compartments formildly symptomatic prodromal cases (P), who show no symptoms but are capable of transmitting the virus,
those who recover from the disease after mild symptoms that did not require hospitalisation (M), those who have severe
symptoms and are admitted to hospital (H), those who recover after hospitalisation (R), and those that die (D). This is
illustrated in Fig. 4.
The stochastic component of the model, i.e. the random introduction of the infection in care homes, is modelled using the
Sellke construction (Andersson & Britton, 2000). Each care home i is given an individual, random threshold of resistance, Qi,
which is drawn from an Uð0;1Þ distribution. At time t, we then calculate the infection pressure IPðtÞ from the background
epidemic so that care home i becomes infected at time Ti, where Ti ¼ infftjIPðtÞ >Qig. The infection pressure up to time t for a
median sized care home is the integral from 0 to t of the force-of-infection (FOI) applied to the care home coming from all
infectious sources, multiplied by a probability p. This probability represents the probability of the infection being introduced
to a median-sized care home. For other care homes, we allow this probability to be proportional to its size, under the
assumption that larger care homes employ more staff and are therefore at higher risk of introduction. When the infection
pressure becomes higher than an individual care home’s resilience threshold, that care home begins its own deterministic
infection dynamics with a single initial infected case. The equations describing the background epidemic and the within-care
home epidemic are given in Appendix D.
Fig. 4. Compartmental model for disease dynamics within a care-home. We extend a deterministic SEIR model to include compartments for prodromal (in-
fectious) cases (P), mildly symptomatic cases that recover without requiring hospitalisation (M), cases that do require hospitalisation and are removed from the
care home (H), cases that die in hospital (D) and cases that recover in hospital (R).
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homes with a total population of approximately 450,000 residents (Care Quality Commission, 2020). Care home sizes range
from 1 to 215, with a mean size of 29.4. In this model we only consider the vulnerable population within care homes. We
assume R0 ¼ 1:5 in the background epidemic, a relatively low value that somehow accounts for a certain degree of control,
and an RC ¼ 3 to allow relatively explosive epidemics in care homes due to potentially more frail individuals, difficulty in
isolation and staff inadvertently passing the infection from one case to the next. The other parameters in the baseline scenario
are reported in Table 4. Apart from the reproductive number, the background epidemic uses the same parameters as the care
home epidemic. However, in the background model there are only rates from E to I and I to R, which are taken to be the rates
from E to P and I to M, respectively.
Fig. 5a shows number of hospital beds occupied and the cumulative number of deaths for the parameter values chosen and
for different values of p. Time is shown inweeks, where week zero represents the peak of the external/background epidemic.
Fig. 5b summarises the first, showing the impact of reducing p on the demand for hospital beds and on the final number of
deaths. It also shows the impact that changing p has on the timing of the peak.
Reducing p corresponds to increasing protection of the vulnerable population in care homes by preventing introduction of
infection (e.g. screening, testing and promoting hygiene among staff, etc.), a policy sometimes termed ‘cocooning’ or
‘shielding’. The results show that reducing p from 0.99 to 0.1 corresponds to a reduction of around 22,000 (83%) in the number
of deaths and around 131,500 in the number of hospitalisations (83%). Strategies aimed at reducing the probability of
introduction into a care home, such as reducing the number of visitors or increased monitoring and protection of care home
staff, are therefore predicted to have a large impact on the number of cases in vulnerable care home populations.
There are a variety of assumptions underpinning this model. Firstly, the background epidemic ignores structure and as-
sumes homogeneous mixing. This is likely to make the peak more pronounced, so presents a worst case scenario for the
demand on hospital beds. The assumption of R0 for the background epidemic only affects the shape and duration of the
background epidemic, since the tuneable parameter p controls the risk of introduction to the care home. That is, if R0 is small,
a large p still presents a high force of infection into the care homes. Therefore, for a fixed p, we expect that changing R0 does
not affect the total number of deaths, but it changes the peak hospitalisation incidence because a faster and more explosive
background epidemic makes epidemics in care homes more synchronised. In fact, when testing the impact of a longer, flatter
background epidemic, for example obtained by simulating three slightly desynchronised background SEIR epidemics, results
have lower peaks and a much more variable timing (not shown). Assuming each care home is independent might not be
realistic, since it is likely that staff are shared between multiple homes, in which case they can act as vectors of transmission
between homes. However, in the model current outbreaks are already quite synchronised (the within care home outbreaks
occur at similar times), so the effect of this assumption is likely to beminimal. The final major assumption is that the epidemic
within the care homes is deterministic. This removes the probability of random extinction and random delays, and should
obviously be relaxed with a stochastic model, given half of care homes have size smaller than 25. However, the extinction
probability is very low with RC ¼ 3, so this stochastic effect is unlikely to have a large impact. Random delays, instead, may
change the shape and timing of the epidemic, which could potentially reduce the peak burden. Therefore, this model rep-
resents a worst case scenario.
Table 4
Information and values for each parameter in our within care home model.
Parameter Value Details
R0 1.5 Basic reproductive ratio (for external epidemic)
RC 3 Basic reproductive ratio (for care-home epidemic)
В R0  g Infectiousness
Р 1=5 Reciprocal of period between exposure and asymptomatic infectiousness
D 1=2 Reciprocal of period between asymptomatic infectiousness and onset of symptoms
G 1=4 Reciprocal of infectious period
pM 0.64 Proportion of vulnerable infectious cases who recover without severe symptoms
pH 0.36 Proportion of vulnerable infectious cases who are hospitalised
Н 1=14 Reciprocal of period of hospitalisation
pR 5/6 Proportion of hospitalised cases that recover
pD 1/6 Proportion of hospitalised cases that die
rP 1/2 Relative infectiousness during prodromal phase
Fig. 5. Hospitalisation prevalence (a) and hospitalisation peak (b) for the care home model.
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In the absence of cure or vaccine for COVID-19, governments worldwide must rely on non-pharmaceutical interventions
(NPIs) to control the outbreak (Haleet al., 2020). A natural such intervention is to ask individuals who express symptoms
similar to COVID-19 to isolate themselves, but variants to such individual isolation might include policies sometimes referred
to as household isolation, household quarantine andmixed isolation. In this section, we investigate how such strategies affect
the spread of the epidemic when bearing in mind that adherence to each intervention may differ.
Individual isolation relies on individuals staying in isolationwhen they express symptoms, thereby stopping transmission.
However, there is potential asymptomatic or prodromal transmission before they go into isolation. Additionally, isolation
strategies generally ask infected individuals to remain at home, which presents an infection risk to the other members of their
household, who may go on to spread the infection.
The term ‘household isolation’ refers to a policy where, upon first detection of symptoms within a household, all in-
dividuals within the household go into isolation for a fixed duration of time. This strategy reduces the risk that other
household members, if they are infected within the household, transmit in the community when pre-symptomatic (and
hence before they self-isolate themselves) or if asymptomatic but still infectious.
A blanket policy invoking a fixed duration of household isolation might cover the full epidemic in a small household.
However, a larger household might present multiple generations of infection, potentially extending the within-household
outbreak beyond the fixed duration of the household isolation policy. To address this issue, ‘household quarantine’ is
another potential strategy. Upon detection of symptoms, the entire household is isolated until a fixed duration of time after
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evading intervention but applies quite drastic measures to the household.
A fourth strategy, that reduces the cost relative to household quarantine, is mixed isolation. Here, upon detection of
symptoms the entire household is isolated for a fixed length of time. Any subsequent cases within the household then un-
dergo individual isolation as described above. This reduces the risk of cases not being isolated whilst allowing recovered
individuals to return to work. There is however still some remaining risk that infected individuals may not yet express
symptoms after the end of the isolation period, but this risk can be controlled through the duration of each isolation.
Although there is now a rich theoretical literature on households models (Ball et al., 2015; Ball, Britton, & Sirl, 2011; Ball,
Mollison, & Scalia-Tomba, 1997), the mainstream methodological tools in this research area present important limitations
that make them not directly applicable to studying these control policies. First, exact theoretical or asymptotic results in these
models are mostly restricted to time-integrated quantities, i.e. those quantities that do not depend on the detailed temporal
shape at which the infectivity is spread by an individual: these are R0 (or any other reproduction number (Ball, Pellis, &
Trapman, 2016; Pellis, Ball, & Trapman, 2012), e.g. the household reproduction number R*), the probability of a large
epidemic, and the epidemic final size (Andersson& Britton, 2000). For this reason, the vast majority of the literature relies on
the standard stochastic SIR model (Andersson & Britton, 2000), despite its unrealistic infectivity profile. Even if more recent
work has expanded beyond time integrated quantities, for example considering the real-time growth rate (Ball et al., 2016;
Pellis, Ferguson,& Fraser, 2011), if the interest is on tracking the dynamics of infection spread, a model based on full temporal
representation of between- and within-household dynamics (House & Keeling, 2008) appears necessary.
A second limitation of standard household models is the key assumption of constant parameter values. This appears
essential for any form of analytical progress. However, in the context of the interventions discussed above, a reduction in
transmission between households, as well as a potential increase inwithin the household, require parameters to change over
time.
To overcome these limitations, we consider two approaches. The first approach fully captures both within and between-
household dynamics with a master-equation formalism, i.e. by relying on a Markovian within-household dynamics and
keeping track of the expected number of households in each possible state of their internal dynamics. The second approach
has a greater emphasis on within-household dynamics, and is fundamentally an independent-households, individual-based,
stochastic simulation. The more limited mathematical tractability is the price to pay for an increased flexibility, as the within-
household Markov assumption is relaxed and exact distributions for delays between events, typically informed by the data,
can be explicitly inputted. Although both approaches can account for increased within-household transmission as isolation
and quarantine are imposed, we only consider this for the second method here. This aspect allows us to study the increased
risk of infection a vulnerable individual in the household would experience following the implementation of a control policy.
To model the households in the UK, we construct a realistic distribution of household sizes (which is given in the supplied
code). We take this demographic data from the 2001 Census (Office for National Statistics, 2011). More recent information,
though less specific on large household sizes, shows that sizes of smaller households are largely unchanged over time (Office
for National Statistics, 2019).
3.3.1. Population and household transmission
In this section, we investigate the above intervention strategies under the assumption that a fraction of households adhere
100% with an intervention and the remaining households ignore the intervention. To model the interventions, we implement
a dynamical household model that explicitly represents the small sizes of households.
The dynamics of the outbreak are simulated using an SEPIR model. This model assumes that there are five possible states
in which an individual can be. These are, susceptible, latent, mildly symptomatic prodrome, symptomatic infectious and
removed. Individuals are infectious during the mildly symptomatic prodrome state and the symptomatic infectious state.
Following (Cauchemez, Carrat, Viboud, Valleron,& Bo€elle, 2004), we assume that within-household transmission scales with
the inverse of the household size to a specified power h. Such a model can be used to investigate how the pathogen spreads
through and between households.
The methodology involved is the use of self-consistent differential equations, first written down by Ball (Ball, 1999). More
recent developments, including numerical methods for these equations, include (Black, Geard, McCaw, McVernon, & Ross,
2017; House & Keeling, 2008; Kinyanjui et al., 2018; Ross, House, & Keeling, 2010). Important features of this approach
include allowing for a small, finite size of each household in which random effects are important and each pair can only
participate in one infection event.
Model. Let Qn;s;e;p;iðtÞ be the proportion of households in the population at time t of size n, with s susceptibles, e exposed, p
prodromal, and i symptomatic infectious individuals. The number of recovered individuals will be n s e p i. In the
absence of household-based interventions, we have
d
dt
Qn;s;e;p;i ¼ 

srs/eðt;Q Þþ ere/p þ prp/i þ iri/4 þnhsptp þnhsiti

Qn;s;e;p;i
þðsþ1Þrs/eðt;Q ÞQn;sþ1;e1;p;i þðeþ1Þre/pQn;s;eþ1;p1;i
þðpþ1Þrp/iQn;s;e;pþ1;i1 þðiþ1Þri/4Qn;s;e;p;iþ1
Fig. 6. Investigating the impact of household intervention with aW ¼ 65% on the number of cases, for two levels of global intervention. The top two figures have
no global intervention, and the bottom two have an ε ¼ 65% reduction in global transmission, e.g. school closure or partial lockdown, lasting for 21 days (between
the vertical lines). The left-most figures have a linear y-axis. The right-most figures show that same results on a logarithmic y-axis. The household size dis-
tribution is taken from the 2001 Census (Office for National Statistics, 2011).
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where we take any Q with logically impossible indices just to equal 0, ra/b is the rate from state a to b, and ta is the
transmission rate from an individual in state a. Here Q is a vector constructed from some ordering (e.g. lexicographic) of the
Qn;s;e;p;i (see the code for details). The transmission into households is given by
rs/eðt;Q Þ¼LðtÞ þ
Xnmax
n¼1
Xn
s¼0
XðnsÞ
e¼0
XðnseÞ
p¼0
XðnsepÞ
i¼0

pbpðtÞþ ibiðtÞ

Qn;s;e;p;i :
Here L represents infections imported from outside the population of households, and the other terms represent between-
household transmissions. In our code, we assumeL is a step function. Results are largely insensitive to the precise choice ofL,
but compared to, for example, random seeding of infections in households, starting the whole population susceptible and
exposing to a small amount of external infection for a fixed time period has less room for the precise initial condition chosen
to influence results, and is more realistic for the situation observed in countries apart from China. We take a ‘global’ inter-
vention as part of the baseline, in particular, we can model phenomena such a school closures that hold during a set of times
T as
bxðtÞ¼
 ð1 εÞbxð0Þ if t2T ;
bxð0Þ otherwise;
for x2fp; ig. We call ε the global reduction. We will generally drop this t-indexing for simplicity, and will also consider only a
household isolation strategy (though the other strategies can be considered similarly, with an example of how other stra-
tegies could be captured in this model framework given in Appendix E). Instead of isolating for a fixed duration, we assume
that a fraction aW of households isolates when there is at least one symptomatic case in the household, and isolating
households leave isolationwhen no symptomatic cases remain.Wemake this assumption since it may potentially capture the
behaviour of real households, who are more likely to remain isolated based on presence of symptoms rather than for a fixed
duration. In the non-Markovian householdmodel in Section 3.3.2 we consider a fixed duration of isolation as described in the
earlier definition. Isolating households do not experience new infections, meaning that the dynamics become
d
dt
Qn;s;e;p;i ¼ 
ð1aW1fi>0gÞsrs/eðt;Q Þþ ere/p þ prp/i þ iri/∅ þnhsptp þnhsitiQn;s;e;p;i
þð1aW1fi> 0gÞðsþ1Þrs/eðt;Q ÞQn;sþ1;e1;p;i þðeþ1Þre/pQn;s;eþ1;p1;i
Fig. 7. Histograms representing the number of infectious cases (x-axis) at different household sizes, against a background of household isolation and for three
levels of global transmission reduction. The global reduction takes the form of a lockdown reducing contacts by 65% for 21, 90 and 180 days. The number of cases
is a cumulative measure of probing the state of each household every two weeks over the 180 day period. The error bar represents a sample standard deviation
computed from the simulation outputs ensemble. The ensemble was constructed by sampling uniformly three model inputs: isolation adherence (aW ), global
reduction (ε) and secondary probability of attack. Parameters are in the main text.
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þnhðsþ1ÞptpQn;sþ1;e1;p;i þnhðsþ1ÞitiQn;sþ1;e1;p;i ;and also do not transmit outside, meaning that the rate of between-household transmission becomes
rs/eðt;Q Þ¼LðtÞ þ
Xnmax
n¼1
Xn
s¼0
XðnsÞ
e¼0
XðnseÞ
p¼0
XðnsepÞ
i¼0
ð1aW1fi>0gÞ

pbp þ ibi

Qn;s;e;p;i :
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the overall growth rate, r, which we take to correspond to a doubling time of three days. Natural history parameters can then
be set directly based on reasonable estimates: re/p to the inverse of the latent period; rp/i to the inverse of the prodromal
period; ri/∅ to the inverse of the symptomatic period. Shaw (Shaw, 2016) analyses various household datasets for respiratory
pathogens and estimates values for h close to 1, so this is taken to be 0.8. The remaining degrees of freedom are relative
infectiousness of the prodrome (taken as a third) and the probability of transmitting within a pair, which we can take as a
typical value given by Shaw (Shaw, 2016). For the numerical results in Figs. 6 and 7, the baseline natural history parameters
are chosen to be re/p ¼ 1=5, rp/i ¼ 1=3, ri/∅ ¼ 1=4.
Summary. Using the given parameter values for our baseline scenario (Table 5), we consider a combination of household
isolation (which follows all-or-nothing adherence) with global reduction in transmission (which follows leaky adherence) for
three weeks and show the results in Fig. 6. The distribution of infectious individuals varies with household size, which is
shown in Fig. 7 for different durations of global intervention. Applying household isolation at 65% adherence (aW ¼ 0:65)
manages to reduce the spread of infection, but appears insufficient in this model and with baseline parameters for controlling
the outbreak in the long-term, unless other intervention strategies that reduce the global transmission (increasing ε) are
adopted at the same time. Alternatively, different levels of adherence can be considered to determine if andwhen control may
be achieved purely through household-based interventions. For the model proposed in the next section, we look into the
effectiveness of increasing adherence.
3.3.2. Non-Markovian models with enhanced within-household transmission
The model described above has the advantage of being able to track the dynamics within the household as well as the
overall epidemic in the population in a relatively efficientmanner.We nowdiscuss a different framework that loses part of the
capability in keeping track of the overall epidemic, but offers further flexibility both in the impact of policies on the within-
household dynamics and in the distributions between events in the infectious life of an individual. We use this model to
investigate the relative effectiveness of the different control policies. We also consider allowing recovered individuals to leave
the household, even in the context of household isolation or household quarantine. This has no impact on the transmission
dynamics, but reduces the individuals’ life disruption and potential economic cost of any policy implemented.
This model assumes that there is no reintroduction within households so each household can only be isolated or quar-
antined once. The assumption that only one household member is infected from outside is approximately satisfied if we
assume homogeneous mixing between households and a large number of households, which are all fully susceptible at the
start of the epidemic. However, the reality of heterogeneous mixing makes reintroduction a likely possibility even early on in
the epidemic. This model, therefore, lacks an explicit description of the social network structure beyond the household. For
simplicity, we assume that within households all individuals are identical in terms of their disease dynamics, although the
methodmight be extended to allow for different age/risk groups with different disease dynamics. We assume that the level of
within-household transmission in a household of size n scales proportionally to 1=ðn  1Þ, though we acknowledge that true
transmission is slightly more complex (Cauchemez et al., 2009).
Model. We consider independent households of size n ¼ 1;2;…;8, for each of which ne stochastic simulations of the within-
household epidemic are performed based on the Sellke construction (Andersson & Britton, 2000; Sellke, 1983). Given all
infectious contacts outside lead to an actual infection because we are in the early phase of the epidemic and there is no
depletion of susceptibles, each case infects, on average, Rg new cases outside. Inside the household, a case would infect on
average Rh cases in an infinitely large household, but not all infectious contacts lead to real infections, given local saturation
effects: in a household of size n, each infectious individual makes on average Rh=ðn1Þ infectious contacts with each other
specific individual throughout the infectious period, but only the first one will result in an infection, and only if the individual
was susceptible at the time of contact.
Each individual is given an indicator function of whether they are symptomatic or not (individuals show symptoms
independently of each other with probability ps) and a resilience threshold. This last quantity is drawn from an exponential
distribution with mean 1, and represents the overall infection pressure this individual is able to withstand before they getTable 5
Information and values for each parameter in our differential equation based households model.
Parameter Value Details
Doubling time 3 days Number of days until the number of cases doubles
rp/i 1=3 Inverse prodromal period
ri/∅ 1=4 Inverse infectious period
re/p 1=5 Inverse latent period
Н 0.8 Inverse exponential scaling of transmission with household size
aW 0.65 Adherence to household isolation
Е 0.65 Reduction in global transmission
tp 0.4 Secondary attack probability for a two-person household with one susceptible and one prodrome
ti 0.8 Secondary attack probability for a two-person household with one susceptible and one infective
Fig. 8. Impact of various control policies on a single epidemic realisation in a household of size 4. The blue solid lines represent the infectivity of symptomatic
individuals. Vertical solid lines represent the times of infection of symptomatic cases. Dashed curves and vertical lines represent the infectivity and time of
infection of asymptomatic cases, which are assumed to be half as infectious as symptomatic ones. The total number of cases under isolation (possibly com-
pounded, e.g. both household and individual isolation) is shown in red (right axis). All random numbers involved in the realisation of the stochastic epidemic are
drawn at the start, before the impact of each control policy is implemented. Row 1 shows no isolation and individual and isolation. Rows 2, 3 and 4 show,
respectively, household isolation, mixed isolation and household quarantine. The difference between the columns is that the basic policy on the left is ‘‘upgraded’’
to the more cost-effective version on the right that allows recovered individuals to leave the house as they cannot transmit outside anymore. When no control is
implemented, the primary case (individual A, infected at time 0) infects another individual (B) around time 11. After a long latent period (i.e. incubation minus
prodromal), B becomes infectious and infects a further individual (C). The last individual (D) escapes infection. When different intervention strategies are in place,
within-household infectivity is increased. This can result in individual C becoming infected earlier in the outbreak and individual D no longer escaping infection,
both due to the increased force of infection. In this simulation, the dynamics for individual B do not change since they are infected before A becomes symp-
tomatic. Individual D is infected earliest under mixed isolation, because within-household transmission is higher than household isolation alone, due to increased
adherence from individual isolation also being in place. Adherence levels to household quarantine are lower than those of household isolation, due to the higher
demand of full quarantine, thus leading to less enhanced within-household transmission. We assume that adherence to individual isolation is 90%, household
isolation is 80% and household quarantine is 60%. The more severe the intervention, the better it captures the infectious periods of infected individuals within the
household.
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coming from all infectious sources.
At the beginning of the within-household epidemic, a single initial case is assumed. Time is discretised with a predefined
time step dt ¼ 0:1 days. At any time step, the current infectivity of all infectives in that time step is summed over, keeping
track differently of the infectivity spread outside and inside the household. An overall measure of the accumulated infectivity
within the household is updated at each time step and when this crosses the resilience threshold of a susceptible individual,
they acquire the infection.
We assume an individual spends half of their time outside and half inside the household. When self-isolation starts, the
assumed adherence ai represents the fraction of the time spent outside that is shifted from outside to within the household.
Therefore, for perfect adherence, from the moment symptoms occur, the individual stops transmitting outside but their
infectivity within the household grows by 100%. We also explore variations in this compensatory behaviour, so that the time
of an individual is split in a more flexible proportion than 1 : 1. The same argument applies to other control policies, with
Table 6
Information and values for each parameter in our non-Markovian households model.
Parameter Value Details
Rg 2.5 Basic reproductive ratio (outside household)
Rh 2.5 Basic reproductive ratio (within household)
R 0.245 Real-time growth rate
mE 4.84 Incubation period mean
sE 2.79 Incubation period standard deviation
dp 1.5 Prodromal period duration
dd 0.5 Delay from symptoms to isolation
di 7 Self isolation duration
mF 2.2 Infectivity mean
sF 1.64 Infectivity standard deviation
fa 0.5 Relative infectivity of asymptomatic individuals
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the same time, their effect is assumed to be multiplicative: if an individual has symptoms and the household isolates, the
outside transmission rate from that individual is reduced from baseline by a multiplicative factor ð1aiÞ  ð1ahÞ and the
within-household transmission rate is the baseline value plus a fraction 1 ðð1aiÞð1ahÞÞ of the baseline value.
Therefore, implementing a control policy that reduces transmission outside might lead to more infections in the household
(see Fig. 8 and the associated accumulated infection pressure in Fig. 10).
We denote by bngðtÞ the average global infectivity profile of a household of size n, i.e. the time-point average of the rates at
which new cases outside are generated by any case infected in all simulated epidemics in a household of size n. During the
exponentially growing phase, any global infection starts a new within-household epidemic. Furthermore, larger households
are more likely to be infected because they have more members. Therefore, if hn is the probability that a randomly selected
household has size n,
pn ¼ nhnP
mmhm
gives the probability that the household of a randomly selected individual is of size n. This is called the size-biased distri-
bution. The global infectivity profile of the average household infected during the exponentially growing phase is then
bgðtÞ¼
X
n
pnb
n
gðtÞ
and the area under this curve is known in the literature as the household reproduction number, and is typically denoted by R*.
If enough transmission is prevented, so that R* <1, the epidemic is controlled. The basic reproduction number R0 and R* share
the same threshold at one, so they are simultaneously larger, equal or smaller than unity. However, in a growing epidemic
R0 <R* (Ball et al., 2016; Pellis et al., 2012). The real-time growth rate r is related to R* by the Lotka-Euler equation
1
R*
¼
Z∞
0
bgðtÞertdt:Parameterisation. At baseline we take Rg ¼ 2:5 and Rh ¼ 2:5, which gives a real-time growth rate r of about 0.245. Each in-
dividual, irrespective of whether they will be infected or not, is given (independently of each other) a duration of: incubation
period (randomly drawn from a Gamma distributionwithmean mE ¼ 4:84 and standard deviation sE ¼ 2:79 days), prodromal
period (dp ¼ 1:5 days), and delay from onset of symptoms to when the individual detects the symptoms and enters isolation
(dd ¼ 0:5 days), and the period of self-isolation (di ¼ 7 days). At the end of the incubation period, a symptomatic individual
starts showing symptoms, which allow the triggering of control policies (after the delay dd). We assume that two thirds of
individuals go on to develop symptoms, with the rest remaining asymptomatic. Asymptomatic individuals do not trigger any
policy. After a latent period (defined as the incubation minus the prodromal period) and irrespective of symptoms, any
infected case starts an infectious period with an infectivity that changes over time following the probability density function
of a Gamma distribution (mean mF ¼ 2:2 and standard deviation sF ¼ 1:64 days). Asymptomatic cases are assumed half as
infectious as symptomatic ones (relative infectivity fa ¼ 0:5).
Summary. Under the baseline parameter values (Table 6), control can in principle be achieved via certain interventions, but
only for high levels of adherence, which might be difficult to enforce for a prolonged length of time (Fig. 9a). More impor-
tantly, the model’s conclusions are highly sensitive to variations in parameter choices, which are uncertain. Parameters that
present problems here are the delay from symptom onset to isolation (with control failing for 1 day detection delay unless
Fig. 9. Impact of different control policies and levels of adherence on transmission, infection risk, and time in isolation. (a) Percentage reduction in R* , defined as
the total amount of community transmission spread by an average household early in the epidemic, which equals 5.3 for baseline parameters in the absence of
control; (b) real-time growth rate, which is assumed to be 0 (rather than negative) when the infection is controlled; (c) increase in risk of infection an initially
susceptible vulnerable person experiences in the household; and (d) the average number of days of isolation a person experiences on average in households of
different sizes, computed for each size as the average total person-days in isolation divided by the number of individuals in the household. In (a)e(c), line styles
refer to different control policies and colours to different levels of adherence to individual isolation. The lower x-axis gives the adherence to household quar-
antine, and the upper x-axis adherence to household isolation. We assume that household isolation is less demanding, and therefore adherence is assumed to be
‘‘twice as high’’, meaning it is at the midpoint between that of household quarantine and 1 (e.g. 0.6 for an x value of 0.2, 0.9 for an x value of 0.8, etc.). The black
dash-dotted line in (a) gives the amount needed to control the spread by achieving R* ¼ 1. Notice how: the effect of individual isolation is independent of
adherence to household quarantine (dotted lines); the effect of household isolation is independent of adherence to individual isolation (overlapping dash-dotted
lines); mixed isolation is always superior to household isolation; household quarantine is only optimal at really high levels of adherence (for these baseline
parameters, generally, beyond the level needed to achieve control), but quickly becomes suboptimal to mixed isolation as adherence is reduced. When a suf-
ficiently large reduction in R* is achieved in (a), the growth rate drops to 0 in (b). The increased risk an initially susceptible vulnerable person is infected at home
(c) does not reflect this effect, as it represents the increased risk conditional on an introduction: if the infection were controlled in the community, the overall risk
of a vulnerable person getting infected would vanish as the risk of introduction in the household vanishes. For these plots, ne ¼ 10000 simulations are performed
for each household size. Nevertheless, a large amount of stochastic noise is still visible in (c). In (d), the same control policies are considered, but the household-
based ones are considered both in their naïve form (where recovered individuals remain isolated), and in their upgraded version where recovered individuals are
free to leave the house: they are identical in terms of transmission but the naïve versions are significantly more costly in terms of person-days of isolation. In a
household of size 1 (no within-household transmission), the days in isolation would be exactly 7 or 14 if all cases were symptomatic (here ps ¼ 2= 3); similarly, in
all households, individual isolation would total exactly 7 days if all cases were symptomatic and all individuals in the household were ultimately infected. In (d),
we assume that adherence is 100% to each intervention.
C.E. Overton et al. / Infectious Disease Modelling 5 (2020) 409e441 427adherence is essentially perfect), proportion of asymptomatic infections (any chance of control lost at 50%) and the strength of
asymptomatic transmission. The short delay before symptomatic individuals isolate may be unrealistic unless the susceptible
population is very well-informed about symptoms that call for isolation, and so likely does not apply in very early stages of an
outbreak. Overall, in the face of themany uncertainties, household-based interventions triggered purely by symptoms appear
useful to slow the spread but need to be complemented by other policies.
Comparing the different strategies (Fig. 9b), household quarantine can be optimal (as one might expect), but this requires
high adherence levels. As adherence drops, this strategy becomes suboptimal to mixed isolation. Mixed isolation is
Fig. 10. Accumulated infection pressure in the simulation presented in Fig. 8 for different control policies. Horizontal dotted lines represent individuals’ resilience
thresholds. As time progresses, the accumulated infection pressures (coloured lines) increase and when they cross the resilience thresholds, the corresponding
individual acquires infection. Notice that: in the absence of control, one individual escapes infection; with household isolation only, the infection pressure reaches
a relatively low endpoint because of the last symptomatic individual slipping through and not transmitting much in the household; with mixed isolation,
infection pressure is higher due to combined adherence; and with household quarantine, the infection pressure builds up more slowly at the beginning due to
lower adherence. We assume that adherence to individual isolation is 90%, household isolation is 80% and household quarantine is 60%.
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drop (relative to household isolation adherence levels). The difference between the two strategies comes down to the
transmission slipping through after the 14 day household isolation. The cheapest strategy, when considering working age
adults, is individual isolation (Fig. 9d), but the effect is limited compared to the othermodels and cannot achieve control in the
baseline scenario even with 100% adherence.
Overall, the mixed isolation strategy appears to be most cost-effective. However, this is dependent on the assumption that
adherence is better for 14 day isolation rather than a very long quarantine. It can be observed that household-based in-
terventions are more effective than individual isolations, demonstrating the importance of these strategies in designing
intervention policy. Fig. 8 shows how the different isolation strategies contain the infectious periods of individuals within the
household and also indicates the number of individuals being isolated within the household.
To study the impact such an increased within-household transmission has on the chance that a vulnerable individual is
infected in the household, we randomly choose one non-primary case in the household as the vulnerable one and count how
many of the ne epidemics result in this individual being infected under the different control policies (Fig. 9c). Under these
interventions, the risk of a vulnerable individual getting infected within-household, conditional on the infection entering it in
the first place, is in the range 5 15%.
Since this model relies on the Sellke construction, we calculate the infection pressure that accumulates (within a
household) during the outbreak. In relation to Fig. 8, we report in Fig. 10 the infection pressure that accumulates for the
different control policies, showing the different impact each intervention can have on the within household dynamics.3.4. Extinction probabilities
Social distancing, isolation and lockdowns act to mitigate the spread of an infectious disease and reduce the number of
cases. However, such interventions, particularly widespread lockdowns, cannot be maintained indefinitely and must be lifted
at some point. For the disease to be controlled, these interventions can be implemented until pharmaceutical interventions
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the situation where interventions are lifted just before extinction, when the number of cases has reached a low but non-zero
initial value n0: at this point, the number of cases might rebound or might go extinct by random chance despite an R0 > 1. We
use a time-inhomogeneous birth-death chain model (Kendallet al., 1948) to investigate the probability of extinction in this
context. The n0 ‘‘initial’’ cases give rise to new cases at a time-dependent rate bðtÞ and recover at rate dðtÞ. Letting ZðtÞ denote
the random variable that gives the number of cases at time t, we are first interested in obtaining an expression for the
probability generating function
Qðt; sÞ¼E
h
sZðtÞ
i
¼
X∞
n¼0
PðZðtÞ¼nÞsn:It follows that Qðt; sÞ satisfies the differential equation
vQ
vt
¼

dðtÞ ðdðtÞþ bðtÞÞsþ bðtÞs2
 vQ
vs
;
subject to the initial conditionQð0; sÞ¼ s:Solving for Q and setting s ¼ 0 gives the probability that, at time t, the number of cases has reached zero and the disease
has become extinct. We denote this probability by qðtÞ (Alexander & Bonhoeffer, 2012), which is given by
qðtÞ¼1
Zt
0

bðt1ÞeIðt1Þ

dt1 þ eIðtÞ
1
;
where IðtÞ ¼ R t0 dðt1Þ  bðt1Þdt1.
The above case considers a closed population. Since the virus has spread worldwide, for any population of interest,
immigration of infected individuals cannot be ignored. To capture this, we model the case where immigration from external
sources is introduced into the system at a rate hðtÞ, and are similarly interested in the randomvariable YðtÞ, which denotes the
number of cases at time t. The corresponding generating function, Rðt; sÞ, for this random variable satisfies
vR
vt
¼

dðtÞ ðdðtÞþbðtÞÞsþbðtÞs2
 vR
vs
þ hðtÞðs1ÞR:Again, solving for Rðt; sÞ and setting s ¼ 0 gives the probability, rðtÞ, that there are no cases of infected individuals left, at
which time a new case can only arise through immigration from an external source. This probability is given by
r

t

¼ exp



1 q

t
Zt
0
hðt1Þdt1
We simulate data based on one initial case n0 ¼ 1, though this may easily be extended to any number of initial cases. We
run simulations both with and without immigration, choosing bðtÞ ¼ 3=ð7ð1þ5etÞÞ and dðtÞ ¼ 1=7 for all t, so that an
effective reproduction number given by bðtÞ=dðtÞ grows gradually from 0.5 to 3 after interventions are released, and choosing
immigration rate hðtÞ ¼ W0et , where W0 is the initial (constant) rate of importation of cases before any controls on
immigration are put into effect. We set W0 ¼ 5 imported cases per day. With these choices of parameters, the resulting
extinction probabilities are given in Fig. 11. Note that we are assuming the immigration rate is decreasing to 0, so if the
infection is controlled internally for long enough, an overall ultimate extinction is possible in this model. For these parameter
choices, the final probability of extinction, defined as limt/∞qðtÞ (without immigration) and limt/∞rðtÞ (with immigration)
are approximately 0.446 and 0.002, respectively. It should be noted that qðtÞ concerns the best case scenario with only one
initial case. Increasing the number of initial cases n0 scales the probability of extinction by qðtÞn0. These probabilities suggest
that, without widespread immunity, stochastic extinction might be aided by social distancing but is heavily compromised by
immigration. Border controls, therefore, if of limited use when transmission is self-sustaining, become key when the number
of cases is low. Note that we have assumed an importation function hðtÞ that goes to 0 for large t, in line with a pandemic that
goes extinct in other geographical regions. However, the presence of an animal reservoir might lead to an importation
function that is non-zero over longer time scales, thus effectively making ultimate extinction impossible unless the effective
reproduction number is kept below one by a systematic and permanent intervention (e.g. technology-based change in
behaviour) or herd immunity.
Fig. 11. Extinction probabilities, both analytic and simulated, for the choices of bðtÞ; dðtÞ and hðtÞ described in the main text. The simulated extinction probabilities
were calculated from 10,000 simulations of a birth-death chain both with and without immigration, for which the code can be obtained via the supplementary
material.
C.E. Overton et al. / Infectious Disease Modelling 5 (2020) 409e4414303.5. Contact tracing and household isolation
Contact tracing is a complementary control policy to isolation or quarantine.When a case is discovered, attempts are made
to identify and isolate individuals who may have been infected. In doing so, some of the secondary cases will be discovered
and isolated early in their infection, decreasing their effective infectious period. If contact tracing is successful, it can greatly
reduce the effective reproduction number of the infection, and in combination with other interventions may drive an
epidemic extinct, as was seen in the case of SARS (Wilder-Smith, Chiew, & Lee, 2020).
Contact tracing in itself presents numerous challenges, which are exacerbated by its success relying not only on the
effectiveness of the tracing process but also the underlying transmission characteristics. For COVID-19, some of these chal-
lenges include mild symptoms which cause infections not to be reported, pre-symptomatic transmissionwhich occurs before
a case is reported, and short generation times (Ganyani et al., 2020) which can cause the epidemic to outrun contact tracing.
Additionally, contact tracing is only feasible for smaller case numbers, because each case generates multiple contacts to follow
up, so the tracing workload expands dramatically, and an increasing number of chains remain unobserved. This makes it a
viable strategy in the early days of an outbreak, or, if containment has failed, following a period of severe interventions, such
as a lockdown. Combining contact tracing with isolation is being considered by many countries as part of a test, trace and
isolate strategy to be implemented once lockdowns or comparable measures are lifted, provided these lockdowns succeed at
driving case numbers sufficiently low. In this section, we develop a household-level contact tracing model for an emerging
outbreak, since we do not wish to make assumptions about immunity or depletion of susceptibles. These assumptions can be
added to the model as the availability of data into immunity improves. We are interested in the likelihood that the contact
tracing process is overwhelmed by large case numbers and the likelihood that, combined with isolation, it can drive the
disease to extinction.
The early days of an outbreak can be modelled using a branching process, where generations of infections produce in-
fectious offspring. Contact tracing processes can be incorporated as a superinfection along the tree generated by the
branching process (Ball, Knock and O’Neill, 2015). When a node is ‘superinfected’ by the contact tracing process, it is isolated.
We model the infection spreading through a fully susceptible population of individuals, segmented into households of
different sizes according to the 2019 ONS survey (Office for National Statistics, 2019), and progress through discrete time steps
of 1 day. As such, our branching process is at the household level, coupled with localised within-household epidemics. This
allows us tomodel contact tracing strategies that isolate whole households, whichmay contain several undetected infections.
It also enables a wider range of contact tracing strategies to be modelled, each with different intervention scope and costs.
Each day, individuals (or nodes) make contacts to a random set of individuals; divided into local contacts to members of
the same household, and global contacts to members of other households. The number of individuals contacted in a day is
distributed using an overdispersed negative binomial distribution and parameterised using estimates from the POLYMOD
social contact survey (Mossong et al., 2008), stratified by household size. Since the probability that a contact causes infection
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2020) and R0 ¼ 3.
For contact tracing to begin, an infection must be diagnosed, which we assume occurs 70% of the time among infected
individuals due to flaws in reporting or very mild symptoms in those infected. We assume a Gamma distributed incubation
period with mean 4.84 (Table 2) and a Geometric reporting delay from symptom onset with mean 4.8 days (Kraemer et al.,
2020). Intuition suggests that if R0 ¼ 3 then tracing two thirds of contacts will control the epidemic. However, in practice
transmissionmay occur before tracing, so this will not reduce the number of infectious contacts by two thirds. To demonstrate
this, we assume that contact tracing successfully traces two thirds of contacts. Trained professionals have to trace all reported
contacts from the last 14 days, so we assume that the contact tracing delay follows a Geometric distribution with a mean of 2
days. Individuals are considered recovered 21 days after infection, as the chances that they are still transmitting then are
negligible.
Though our general framework can be modified extensively, we assume the following contact tracing strategy. When an
individual reports infection, their household is immediately isolated. Contact tracing attempts are then made for all
households connected to one of the individuals in this household, whether symptomatic or not.When a connected household
is identified (after the contact tracing delay), all individuals within the household are immediately placed under observation.
If any of the individuals in the observed households develop symptoms, then the household becomes isolated and the contact
tracing process continues to connected households. When a household is isolated, we assume all individuals are isolated with
100% adherence, and cannot transmit the virus within or outside the household. The assumption that isolation prevents local
infections is unrealistic, but does not change the overall behaviour of the process as there are no more global infections. This
strategy imposes high individual-level cost, since by isolating all individuals within a household, it isolates individuals who
have not had direct contact with an infected individual. In practice, such a strategy may have poor adherence. Fig. 13a shows
an example contact tracing network.
3.5.1. Hitting times of contact tracing capacities
When choosing contact tracing strategies, a balance must be struck between the effectiveness of a strategy and the re-
sources that it requires. Some strategies are only feasible when there are few infections, since the resources required can grow
rapidly depending on the dynamics of the outbreak and the contact tracing process.
To define the capacity of the contact tracing process, we consider the ability of a public health agency to observe the
condition of those asked to self-isolate, due to their recent exposure to an infected individual. The health agency must remain
in contact for the duration of the 14 day self-isolation period, so that if any individual under isolation develops symptoms and
then tests positive, the contact tracing process can be initiated on this node. Wewill define the capacity of the contact tracing
process to be the number of people that can be placed under observation and assume two possible capacities: 800 and 8000.
We assume that when a node is contact traced, they are asked to report their global contacts for the last 14 days. All global
contacts are assumed to be to a new person since we are in the early stages of an outbreak. Parameters are given in Table 8.
We carried out 6507 simulations of the contact tracing process for 150 days. Contact tracing capacity was reached in 5000
simulations, and in 180 the epidemic neither went extinct nor was the 8000 capacity reached. In the remaining simulations,
the epidemic went extinct. Fig. 12a and Table 8 show that increasing the contact tracing capacity tenfold less than doubles the
time until that capacity is reached. However, it does increase the odds of driving the epidemic to extinction without hitting
the capacity by about 10% (Table 7). Different contact tracing strategies will strain different aspects of the health agency. A
strategy that generates large amounts of work is only feasible if there are few active infections. The optimal strategy will need
to compromise and may need to change depending on the number of active infections, which cannot be directly observed.
3.5.2. Extinction time
When there is a small number of cases in a single country, it may be possible to drive the pathogen to extinction. This small
case number could correspond to the start of an outbreak or removing of severe interventions.We consider the latter case, but
conservatively assume a fully susceptible population.
We assume that social distancing is enforced on day 0 and reduces global contacts by 70%. Full parameters are given in
Table 8. Since we are interested in extinction, we will no longer consider the contact tracing capacity. Under these baseline
parameter assumptions and 10,000 simulations, the combined force of this contact tracing strategy and isolation is enough to
drive the epidemic extinct (Fig. 13b), but measures will need to be in place for months in some cases. If the infection is ever re-
imported, then the process would begin again, since herd immunity is not achieved. Note that theminimum extinction time is
21 days due to this being the time after which an infected individual is labelled recovered.Table 7
Contact tracing capacity hitting probability and hitting time distribution.
Quantity Results
Mean (time 800 capacity reached) 13.9 days
Mean (time 8000 capacity reached) 22.5 days
Hitting probability (800) 81.2%
Hitting probability (8000) 76.8%
Table 8
Contact tracing model - parameter table.
Parameter Value Details
R0 3 Basic reproductive ratio
Generation time 5 days Mean time from being infected to infecting another individual
Incubation period 4.84 days Mean time from being infected to developing symptoms
Reporting delay 4.8 days Mean time from developing symptoms to reporting to a healthcare system
Diagnoses rate 70% Proportion of cases that are successfully diagnosed
Contact tracing success rate 66.67% Proportion of contacts that are successfully traced
Contact tracing delay 2 days Mean length of time taken to trace contacts after reporting of a case
Time to recovery 21 days Length of time until individuals are taken to no longer be infectious
Global reduction 70% Reduction in transmission caused by large-scale global interventions
Fig. 12. Capacity hitting times for the contact tracing model.
Fig. 13. Example of the contact tracing process (a) and the extinction times distribution (b) for the contact tracing model.
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have shown that importation of cases significantly reduces the extinction probability. This suggests that extinction may no
longer be guaranteed, and the time to extinction will be significantly increased. This analysis has focused on a single contact
tracing strategy using indicative parameters for COVID-19. The proposed model can be extended to more strategies and
region specific parameters to inform the design of control policies. Also, as is shown in Table 8, contact tracing capacity is
likely to be reached, which may prevent extinction from being achieved. This complication is compounded by the issues of
loss of immunity or the presence of an animal reservoir discussed in Section 3.4.
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In this manuscript we have presented a range of mathematical tools to tackle infectious disease outbreaks. In particular,
these tools address various technical questions posed by the authors to support the ongoing public health response to COVID-
19. This toolkit considers both estimation efforts for key parameters, and investigative efforts (often numerical simulations) in
gauging the effectiveness of various intervention or control measures. Joint consideration of estimation and simulation efforts
is critical. Parameter estimates are obtained using a certain set of assumptions regarding the data, and investigations or
simulations utilising these estimates should ensure that their underlying assumptions are consistent. These challenges in
model construction and applicability of statistical methods are compounded by the limitations of the data with which de-
cisionsmust bemade. Some of the biases present in the data can be addressedwith an improved data collectionmethodology
- often challenging in the context of a fast-moving outbreak - but many are also inherent to the nature of early outbreak data
(Britton & Scalia Tomba, 2019; Lesko, Keil, & Edwards, 2020 Edwards). The consequent lack of intuitive insight from this data
underscores the need for careful parametric estimates, especially considering the large variability in predicted outcomes
resulting from small differences in parameters. Even with robust estimates for some parameters, many other parameters are
challenging to estimate using the available data. Therefore, models need to address this variability and uncertainty in order to
inform public health policy.
We have presented methods to address biases arising from a growing force of infection, changes in the reporting rate,
truncated data samples and a varying travel rate. We use these methods to account for these biases when estimating delay
distributions, such as the incubation period, and the growth rate/doubling time. These biases can have significant impact
when estimating key parameters: the mean incubation period estimates for COVID-19 range from 3.48 days without cor-
recting for truncation to 4.84 days with the correction, and the doubling time in Hubei province decreases from 3.15 days
without correcting for travel to 2.77 days. These differences can significantly alter our understanding of the outbreak, and
could have a large impact on policy and public health. For instance, underestimating the incubation period may lead to
quarantine strategies failing to identify infected individuals if the quarantine length is too short. Overestimating the doubling
time (or underestimating the growth rate) will underestimate the risk posed to the host population - both in terms of final
size of the epidemic and the rate at which it spreads, which can have significant public health impacts as discussed in (Pellis,
Cauchemez, Ferguson and Fraser, 2020).
It is important to note that the above-mentioned biases, and consequent impact of implementing the methods correcting
for their presence, may vary across different settings. As an example, the potential underestimation of the COVID-19 growth
rate is exacerbated by an overlap in early outbreaks with a period of significant travel and movement in China, and would be
less detrimental if first observed in other populations such as Italy. Also, for the incubation period, we have shown two
different types of data; one fromWuhan and one from discrete infection events. In the Wuhan data set, truncation and force
of infection biases are very important, whereas in the other data set, there is no force of infection bias since the infection
events are observed.
When an outbreak occurs in an enclosed group, such as a large gathering, wemaywish to know howmany individuals are
likely to be infected. We developed a statistical method to estimate the first generation size based on the number of
symptomatic individuals, taking care to account for the uncertainty in this quantity. This ready reckoner can inform testing of
large groups to help control the disease spread, but does not apply to later generations or the possible interventions enacted
on the population.
Building on these enclosed population scenarios, we have developed a set of models that investigate public control
measures or interventions on enclosed populations, such as households and care homes. These structured descriptions
improve the population risk profiles relative to assumptions of homogeneousmixing. A complementary aspect to a structured
population when modelling interventions is adherence. Motivated by vaccination modelling, we consider leaky adherence,
where every household chooses to adhere or not whenever an event occurs, and all-or-nothing adherence, where some
households adhere every time and some never adhere. We observed that in a homogeneous population, although the two
types of adherence predict the same growth rate and final size, the timing of the peak and the early growth can be faster under
all-or-nothing adherence. This insight, combined with lessons from the vaccination literature, suggests that efforts should
focus on ensuring complete adherence in individuals or households with some level of pre-existing adherence, rather than
pushing non-adherent individuals or households to change behaviour.
Dedicated modelling of disease spread in care homes is essential due to the documented history of co-morbidity of their
residents during pandemics (Guan et al., 2020), (Guan et al., 2020; Wilder-Smith, Chiew, & Lee, 2020; Wu et al., 2020; Wu &
McGoogan, 2020; Yang et al., 2020; Zhou et al., 2020). We do so by regarding care homes as closed populations that are
subjected to a force of infection from an external epidemic. We develop a tool for analysing the risk posed to this population
by determining the peak size of the epidemicwithin the care homes and the number of deaths. Applying thismodel to COVID-
19, we find that by ‘‘cocooning” the care homes, i.e. shielding them to reduce the chance of introduction from the external
outbreak, we can significantly reduce the size of the peak and therefore reduce the number of deaths. However, assessing the
necessary level of shielding requires accurate characterisation of the external force of infection, and underestimating this may
invalidate shielding efforts. A limitation to the proposed model is the deterministic within care home epidemic. However,
since the average size of care homes is relatively large and we assume a high R0 within care homes, the deterministic
assumption is unlikely to significantly alter the conclusions.
C.E. Overton et al. / Infectious Disease Modelling 5 (2020) 409e441434Whenmodelling households however, we are concerned with much smaller population sizes. Therefore, it is important to
consider stochastic effects within each household, combined with between-household dynamics. We consider two different
household models: one which contains features of both within- and between-household transmission, where small-scale
transmission can be linked to the epidemic on a population level, and another which facilitates more detail in the within-
household transmission and delay distributions, but with reduced correspondence to the population-wide transmission.
With the first model, a 65% adherence to household isolation appears insufficient to control the epidemic without severe
global reductions in transmission. Coupled with a short term global reduction, the epidemic can be controlled, but upon
lifting the global intervention, which could take the form of a lockdown, household isolation is insufficient to maintain
control. For the second model, we look into changing the strength of adherence, and the impact this can have on achieving
control. Indicative but reasonable parameter values suggest that the COVID-19 outbreak can potentially be controlled using
household isolation strategies, provided the level of adherence is sufficiently high. However, such a high level of adherence
may be difficult to maintain in the long-term and this modicum of control is anyway highly sensitive to the chosen pa-
rameters. We further investigated the efficacy of various isolation or quarantine measures. A policy of individual isolation
struggles to curtail the epidemic for any adherence. Instead, mixed isolation, whereby first the whole household isolates and
any individual infected during isolation goes on to self isolate after household isolation is lifted, appears to be the most cost-
effective strategy.
Countries have put into place strict social distancing and lockdown intervention to suppress or regain control of epidemics
that threaten to overwhelm the health system and cause massive mortality, but they cannot be sustained in the long term
without growing social and economic costs. We have shown however, that the probability of the epidemic becoming extinct
once these policies are lifted, even when very few cases remain, is very small. We therefore consider a contact tracing
intervention as a potential strategy for managing the COVID-19 outbreak, once severe lockdown interventions are lifted. We
developed a household-level contact tracing model to explore the feasibility of combining these strategies to control the
epidemic. Firstly, we noted that by using knowledge of household structure, we can reduce the burden on the contact tracing
process by isolating household and removing them from the contact tracing process once an infected member has been
identified. Secondly, we investigated how contact tracing combined with household isolation may drive the disease to
extinction, finding that aggressive contact tracing coupled with household isolation can drive the epidemic to extinction
under the indicative parameters assumed, when starting with a single infection. However, the time until extinction can be
impractically long, which risks the contact tracing capacity being overwhelmed, suggesting such a strategy may be infeasible
in practice. A less aggressive strategy could be implemented that would be less likely to overwhelm local health agencies.
Whilst it may not lead to extinction, this can still be beneficial at mitigating and controlling the spread of an outbreak as part
of a test, trace and isolate strategy.
There are many complexities whenmodelling an outbreak of a novel infectious disease. To address some of these, we have
described a variety of techniques to serve as part of a generally applicable toolkit. However, our proposed models, and many
othermodels, are subject to important limitations whichmust be considered prior to their application. Key among these is the
lack of heterogeneous population mixing, such as through age-stratification (Pellis et al., 2020a) and different risk-groups
(Valdano, Poletto, Boelle, & Colizza, 2019, pp. 1e18), and spatio-temporal variations (Lau et al., 2017), all of which influ-
ence modelling estimates and predictions. Nevertheless, the relative simplicity of the presented models allows for the
development of qualitative intuition regarding the efficacy of various intervention methods, whilst providing tractable
theoretical frameworks which can be further developed and better inform policy-makers.
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Appendix A. Independence of the incubation period likelihood function and the reporting rate
To estimate the incubation period distribution, we need to find the distribution that maximises the probability of
observing the sampled data. However, the sampled data does not directly record incubation period, and instead contains
infection exposure window and the symptom onset date. Additionally, the sample does not contain all individuals, and
therefore there is a reporting rate that must be incorporated into the likelihood function. If the reporting rate is constant, it
can be ignored. However, in the data coming out the Wuhan, the reporting rate varies significantly, since individuals are no
C.E. Overton et al. / Infectious Disease Modelling 5 (2020) 409e441 435longer exported from Wuhan after travel restrictions. Since the reporting rate depends on individuals leaving Wuhan, the
main factor effecting the probability that a case is included in the data set is the date an individual leaves Wuhan. Therefore,
the reporting rate depends on the days an individual spends in Wuhan and is independent of their symptom onset date. We
need the likelihood function that an individual was infected between days a and b, had symptom onset on day y, and was
included in the data set.
Wewill condition against the infectionwindow, a< I< b, the case being included in the data set, x2D, and symptom onset
occurring before the truncation date, Y < T , and determine the probability that for such an individual we observe the given
symptom onset date, Y ¼ y. That is, we need to find PðY ¼ yjfa < I < bg∩fY  Tg∩fx2DgÞ. This can be rearranged to
PðfY ¼ yg∩fa< I< bg∩fY  Tg∩fx2DgÞ
Pðfa< I< bg∩fY  Tg∩fx2DgÞ ¼
PðfY ¼ yg∩fx2Dgjfa< I<bgÞ
PðfY  Tg∩fx2Dgjfa< I< bgÞ
¼ PðfY ¼ ygjfa< I<bgÞPðfx2Dgjfa< I< bgÞ
PðfY  Tgjfa< I< bgÞPðfx2Dgjfa< I< bgÞ
¼ PðfY ¼ ygjfa< I<bgÞ
PðfY  Tgjfa< I< bgÞ
¼ PðfY ¼ yg∩fa< I< bgÞ
PðfY  Tg∩fa< I< bgÞ
¼
Z b
a
PðfY ¼ yg∩fI ¼ igÞdiZ b
a
PðfY  Tg∩fI ¼ igÞdi
¼
Z b
a
gðiÞfqðy iÞdiZ b
a
gðiÞ
Z Ti
0
fqðxÞdxdi
;
where fq is the probability density function of the incubation period distribution. Therefore, the likelihood function
PðY ¼ yja < I < b;Y  TÞ is independent of the reporting rate for the data coming out of Wuhan in the early days of the
outbreak.
Appendix B. Generation-size derivation
We wish to determine the probability that the first generation has e0 individuals, E0 ¼ e0, given that it symptomatic
individuals are observed on day t, It ¼ it, which is given by
P
 
E0 ¼ eojIt ¼ itÞ¼
Z1
0
PðE0 ¼ e0∩P¼pjIt ¼ it
!
dp
¼
Z1
0
PðEo ¼ e0jIt ¼ it∩P¼pÞPðP¼pjIt ¼ itÞdp
¼
Z1
0
PðE0 ¼ e0∩It ¼ itjP ¼ pÞ
PðIt ¼ itjP ¼ pÞ PðP¼pjIt ¼ itÞdpTo solve this, we need to determine the distribution of the infection probability P given the number of observed symp-
tomatics. Assuming that P is uniformly distributed, we have
PðP¼ pjIt ¼ itÞfPðIt ¼ itjP¼pÞ
n

it nit¼
it
ðpFðtÞÞ ð1 pFðtÞÞ

n

it nitPðP¼ pjIt ¼ itÞ¼ c it ðpFðtÞÞ ð1 pFðtÞÞ ;where Fð ,Þ is the cumulative density function for the incubation period, n is the number of initially exposed individuals, and c
is a normalising constant such that
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 Z1
0

n
it

ðpFðtÞÞit ð1 pFðtÞÞnitdp
!1

n
1
i¼ it
ðit þ 1ÞðFðtÞÞ t
2F1ðit þ 1; it  n; it þ 2; FðtÞÞ
pit ði þ 1Þð1 pFðtÞÞnit
PðP¼pjIt ¼ itÞ¼ t
2F1ðit þ 1; it  n; it þ 2; FðtÞÞ
;
where F represents the hypergeometric function (Abramowitz & Stegun, 1948). Substituting this into Equation (3) gives2 1
PðE0 ¼ eojIt ¼ itÞ¼
Z1
0

n
e0

pe0 ð1 pÞne0

e0
it

FðtÞit ð1 FðtÞÞe0it
n
it

ðpFðtÞÞit ð1 pFðtÞÞnit
pitðit þ 1Þð1 pFðtÞÞnit
2F1ðit þ 1; it  n; it þ 2; FðtÞÞ
dp
Z1  e0
¼
0
pe0 ð1 pÞn  1 FðtÞ
1 p  ð1 FðtÞÞ
it ðn itÞ!ðit þ 1Þ
ðn e0Þ!ðe0  itÞ!
1
2F1ðit þ 1; it  n; it þ 2; FðtÞÞ
dp;
which simplifies toPðE0 ¼ eojIt ¼ itÞ¼
e0!
ðe0  itÞ!
ð1 FðtÞÞe0  ð1 FðtÞÞ
it ðn itÞ!ðit þ 1Þ
ðnþ 1Þ!2F1ðit þ 1; it  n; it þ 2; FðtÞÞ
:
This gives a distribution of the generation-size based on the number of observed symptomatic individuals by time t.
Appendix C. Estimating the generation size using a lower bound on the number of symptomatic individuals
In the analysis in Section 2.4, it is assumed that every person who has developed symptoms by time t is known to the
observer. However, depending on the disease, symptoms can be subjective. One person may not notice something another
person may visit hospital for. Additionally, one person may not want to come forward with symptoms if they are worried
about the repercussions of coming forward (for example being isolated against their own will).
To address this, rather than considering It as the total number of people who have developed symptoms by time t, we can
consider~It as the number of peoplewho have presentedwith symptoms by time t. We do no know the true value of It, but we
know that it cannot be below~It. We assume that the probability of ~It being~it for a given value of it is uniform at 1itþ1. We can
then use the same methods as above to infer a distribution for P.
Pð~It ¼~itjIt ¼ itÞ¼
8><
>:
1
it þ 1; if 0 
~it  it
0; otherwiseC.1. Inferring a distribution for P given ~It ¼ ~it
We again assume an uninformative uniform prior distribution for P and as a result the posterior distribution for P is
proportional to the likelihood that ~It ¼ ~it given P ¼ p:
PðP ¼ pj~It ¼ ~itÞfPð~It ¼ ~itjP ¼ pÞ ¼
Xn
it¼~it
PðIt ¼ itjP ¼ pÞ  1it þ 1
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Xn
it¼~it

n
it

ðpFðtÞÞit ð1 pFðtÞÞnit 1
it þ 1 ¼

n
~it
 ðpFðtÞÞ~it
~it þ 1
ð1 pFðtÞÞn~it2F1

1;~it  n;~it þ 2; pFðtÞ1 pFðtÞ

PðP¼ pj~It ¼~itÞ¼ c
  ~it ~  n
~it
ðpFðtÞÞ
~it þ 1
ð1 pFðtÞÞnit2F1 1;~it n;~it þ2;
pFðtÞ
1 pFðtÞ
where c is a normalising constant such thatc¼
 Z1
0

n
~it
 ðpFðtÞÞ~it
~it þ 1
ð1 pFðtÞÞn~it2F1

1; il  n; il þ 2;
pFðtÞ
1 pFðtÞ

dp
!1
   ~ Z1   !1
¼ nil
FðtÞit
~it þ 1
0
p
~itð1 pFðtÞÞn~it2F1 1;~it  n;~it þ 2;
pFðtÞ
1 pFðtÞ dp
			~ ~  ~it n~it  ~ ~ pFðtÞ PP¼p	It ¼ it ¼p 1 pFðtÞÞ 2F1 1; it n; it þ2; 1 pFðtÞ
 Z1    1
0
y
~it 1 yFðtÞÞn~it2F1 1;~it  n;~it þ 2;
yFðtÞ
1 yFðtÞ dyHowever, this integral cannot be found analytically and instead must be calculated numerically.
C.2 Inferring a distribution for E0 given ~It ¼ ~it
We can use the same probability analysis in Section 2.4 to write the following probability formula:
P
 
E0 ¼ eo
					~It ¼~it
!
¼
Z1
0
PðE0 ¼ eo∩~It ¼ ~itjP ¼ pÞ
Pð~It ¼ ~itjP ¼ pÞ
P

P¼ p
				~It ¼~it

dp

n

e0 ne0Pe0  e0  i e0i 1
¼
Z1
0
e0
p ð1 pÞ
i¼~it i
FðtÞ ð1 FðtÞÞ  iþ1
n
~it

ðpFðtÞÞ~it
~itþ1
ð1 pFðtÞÞn~it2F1

1;~it  n;~it þ 2; pFðtÞ1pFðtÞ

~it

n~it

~ ~ pFðtÞ

p 1 pFðtÞÞ 2F1 1; it n; it þ2;1 pFðtÞ
 Z1    1
0
y
~it 1 yFðtÞÞn~it2F1 1;~it  n;~it þ 2;
yFðtÞ
1 yFðtÞ dy dp
 e0 ~it  
¼
Z1
0
pð1FðtÞÞ
1p
1
1FðtÞ ð1 pÞnðn~itÞ!2F1 1;~it  e0;~it þ 2;
FðtÞ
1FðtÞ
ðe0 ~itÞ!ðn e0Þ!
 Z1    1

0
y
~it 1 yFðtÞÞn~it2F1 1;~it  n;~it þ 2;
yFðtÞ
1 yFðtÞ dy dpAppendix D. Ordinary differential equations for the care home model
To model the background epidemic, we use the following system of ordinary differential equations
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dt
¼  b SI
N
;
dE SI
dt
¼ b
N
 rE;
dI
dt
¼ rE  gI;
dR
dt
¼ gI:This provides a force of infection that is used tomodel seeding within each care home via the Sellke construction, with the
details provided in the main text. Once infection has been seeded within a care home, the epidemic progresses using the
following ordinary differential equations
dS
dt
¼  S ðbCI þ rPbcPÞ
N
;
dE ðbCI þ rPbcPÞ
dt
¼ S
N
 rE;
dP
dt
¼ rE  dP;
dI
dt
¼ dP  gI;
dM
dt
¼ gpMI;
dH
dt
¼ gpHI  hH;
dR
dt
¼ hpRH;
dD
dt
¼ gpDH;
dN
dt
¼  gpHI:We add further compartments to the within care homemodel since we are interested in the different pathways that these
individuals may take. For the background epidemic this is not important, since all we need is a force of infection provided by
individuals in the infectious class.
Appendix E. Population and household transmission: Individual isolation and household quarantine
Individual isolation does not intimately involve the household and so we assume that a fraction aI of symptomatic cases
self-isolates and ceases transmission outside the household, meaning that we take the baseline but with
rs/eðt;Q Þ¼LðtÞ þ
Xnmax
n¼1
Xn
s¼0
XðnsÞ
e¼0
XðnseÞ
p¼0
XðnsepÞ
i¼0

pbp þð1aIÞibi

Qn;s;e;p;i :To capture the essential features of household quarantine, we need to add states to the dynamical variables. Let Qn;s;e;p;i;fðtÞ
be the proportion of households in the population at time t of size n, with s susceptibles, e exposed, p prodromal, and i
symptomatic infectious individuals, and with vector of ‘flags’ f representing implementation of more complex interventions.
We now suppose that a fraction aS of households start to isolate when there is at least one symptomatic case in the
household, and stop isolation 14 days (on average) after the absence of symptoms in the household. This is modelled by
having a flag f ¼ 0 if the household is not isolating and f ¼ 1 if it is. The dynamics become
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dt
Qn;s;e;p;i;1 ¼ 

ere/p þprp/i þ iri/∅ þnhsptp þnhsiti þ1fi¼0gs

Qn;s;e;p;i;1
þðeþ1Þre/pQn;s;eþ1;p1;i;1 þðpþ1Þrp/iQn;s;e;pþ1;i1;1þðiþ1Þri/∅Qn;s;e;p;iþ1;1 þnhðsþ1ÞptpQn;sþ1;e1;p;i;1þnhðsþ1ÞitiQn;sþ1;e1;p;i;1 þ1fi¼1&sþeþp¼n1gaSðpþ1Þrp/iQn;s;e;pþ1;i1;0 ;
for households in quarantined
dt
Qn;s;e;p;i;0 ¼ 

srs/eðt;Q Þþ ere/p þ prp/i þ iri/∅ þnhsptp þnhsiti

Qn;s;e;p;i;0
þðsþ1Þrs/eðt;Q ÞQn;sþ1;e1;p;i;0 þðeþ1Þre/pQn;s;eþ1;p1;i;0
þðpþ1Þrp/iQn;s;e;pþ1;i1;0 þðiþ1Þri/4Qn;s;e;p;iþ1;0
þnhðsþ1ÞptpQn;sþ1;e1;p;i;0 þnhðsþ1ÞitiQn;sþ1;e1;p;i;0
þ1fi¼0gsQn;s;e;p;i;1 þ

11fi¼1&sþeþp¼n1gaS
ðpþ1Þrp/iQn;s;e;pþ1;i1;0 ;
for households not in quarantine, with between-household termrs/eðt;Q Þ¼LðtÞ þ
Xnmax
n¼1
Xn
s¼0
XðnsÞ
e¼0
XðnseÞ
p¼0
XðnsepÞ
i¼0

pbp þ ibi

Qn;s;e;p;i;0 :In this model, we assume that the duration of isolation after the absence of symptoms is exponentially distributed with
mean equal to the fixed isolation period, given by 1=s. This assumption aids themodelling and is justifiable because, in reality,
although a household may choose to isolate, they may not strictly follow the fixed period. It is likely that within-household
isolation will increase transmission to other members of the household. We do not incorporate this property into the model,
but this limitation is worth bearing in mind when drawing conclusions about the effectiveness of different strategies.
Author contributions
CO and HS compiled the manuscript. All authors were involved in the research and revising of the manuscript.
Data and materials
All data and code used in this analysis is provided in the Github repository https://github.com/thomasallanhouse/covid19-
stochastics and https://github.com/thomasallanhouse/covid19-growth, with the exception of UK specific data. This data is
provided by Public Health England under a data sharing agreement and we are unable to share this data.
References
Abramowitz, M., & Stegun, I. A. (1948). Handbook of mathematical functions with formulas, graphs, and mathematical tables (Vol. 55). US Government printing
office.
Alexander, H. K., & Bonhoeffer, S. (2012). Pre-existence and emergence of drug resistance in a generalized model of intra-host viral dynamics. Epidemics,
4(4), 187e202.
Andersson, H., & Britton, T. (2000). Stochastic epidemics in dynamic populations: Quasi-stationarity and extinction. Journal of Mathematical Biology, 41(6),
559e580.
Andreasen, V. (2011). The final size of an epidemic and its relation to the basic reproduction number. Bulletin of Mathematical Biology, 73(10), 2305e2321.
Ball, F. (1999). Stochastic and deterministic models for SIS epidemics among a population partitioned into households. Mathematical Biosciences, 156(1),
41e67.
Ball, F., Britton, T., House, T., Isham, V., Mollison, D., Pellis, L., et al. (2015). Seven challenges for metapopulation models of epidemics, including households
models. Epidemics, 10, 63e67 (Challenges in Modelling Infectious Disease Dynamics).
Ball, F., Britton, T., & Sirl, D. (2011). Household epidemic models with varying infection response. Journal of Mathematical Biology, 63(2), 309e337.
Ball, F. G., Knock, E. S., & O’Neill, P. D. (2015). Stochastic epidemic models featuring contact tracing with delays. Mathematical Biosciences, 266, 23e35.
Ball, F., Mollison, D., & Scalia-Tomba, G. (1997). Epidemics with two levels of mixing. Annals of Applied Probability, 46e89.
Ball, F., Pellis, L., & Trapman, P. (2016). Reproduction numbers for epidemic models with households and other social structures II: Comparisons and
implications for vaccination. Mathematical Biosciences, 274, 108e139.
Biggerstaff, M., Dahlgren, F. S., Fitzner, J., George, D., Hammond, A., Hall, I., et al. (2020). Coordinating the real-time use of global influenza activity data for
better public health planning. Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses, 14(2), 105e110.
Black, A. J., Geard, N., McCaw, J. M., McVernon, J., & Ross, J. V. (2017). Characterising pandemic severity and transmissibility from data collected during first
few hundred studies. Epidemics, 19, 61e73.
Brauer, F. (2019). The final size of a serious epidemic. Bulletin of Mathematical Biology, 81(3), 869e877.
Britton, T., & Scalia Tomba, G. (2019). Estimation in emerging epidemics: Biases and remedies. Journal of The Royal Society Interface, 16(150), 20180670.
Butler, D. (2014). Models overestimate Ebola cases. Nature, 515(7525), 18.
Care Quality Commission. (2020). CQC care directory - with ratings (1 April 2020).
Cauchemez, S., Carrat, F., Viboud, C., Valleron, A. J., & Bo€elle, P. Y. (2004). A bayesian MCMC approach to study transmission of influenza: Application to
household longitudinal data. Statistics in Medicine, 23(22), 3469e3487.
Cauchemez, S., Donnelly, C. A., Reed, C., Ghani, A. C., Fraser, C., Kent, C. K., et al. (2009). New England Journal of Medicine, 361, 2619e2627.
C. Chew and G. Eysenbach. Pandemics in the age of twitter: Content analysis of tweets during the 2009 H1N1 outbreak. PloS One, 5(11), 2010.
C.E. Overton et al. / Infectious Disease Modelling 5 (2020) 409e441440Chinazzi, M., Davis, J. T., Ajelli, M., Gioannini, C., Litvinova, M., Merler, S., et al. (2020). The effect of travel restrictions on the spread of the 2019 novel
coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak. Science, 368, 395e400.
Department of Health and Social Care. (2018). SPI-M modelling summary for pandemic influenza, Edition. Nov.
Fang, L., Karakiulakis, G., & Roth, M. (2020). Are patients with hypertension and diabetes mellitus at increased risk for COVID-19 infection? The Lancet
Respiratory Medicine, 8(4), e21.
Farewell, V. T., Herzberg, A. M., James, K. W., Ho, L. M., & Leung, G. M. (2005). SARS incubation and quarantine times: When is an exposed individual known
to be disease free? Statistics in Medicine, 24(22), 3431e3445.
Ferguson, N. M., Laydon, D., Nedjati-Gilani, G., Imai, N., Ainslie, K., Baguelin, M., et al. (2020). Impact of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) to reduce
COVID-19 mortality and healthcare demand.
Ferretti, L., Wymant, C., Kendall, M., Zhao, L., Nurtay, A., Abeler-D€orner, L., et al. (2020). Quantifying SARS-CoV-2 transmission suggests epidemic control
with digital contact tracing. Science, 368.
Funk, S., Gilad, E., Watkins, C., & Jansen, V. A. A. (2009). The spread of awareness and its impact on epidemic outbreaks. Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences, 106(16), 6872e6877.
Ganyani, P., Kremer, C., Chen, D., Torneri, A., Faes, C., Wallinga, J., et al. (2020). Estimating the generation interval for COVID-19 based on symptom onset data.
medRxiv.
Goldstein, E., Paur, K., Fraser, C., Kenah, E., Wallinga, J., & Lipsitch, M. (2009). Reproductive numbers, epidemic spread and control in a community of
households. Mathematical Biosciences, 221(1), 11e25.
Gostic, K. M., Gomez, A. C. R., Mummah, R. O., Kucharski, A. J., & Lloyd-Smith, J. O. (2020). Estimated effectiveness of symptom and risk screening to prevent
the spread of COVID-19. eLife, 9, 1e18.
Guan, W., Ni, Z., Hu, Y., Liang, W., Ou, C., He, J., et al. (2020). Clinical characteristics of coronavirus disease 2019 in China. New England Journal of Medicine,
382, 1708e1720.
Hale, T., et al. (2020). Oxford COVID-19 government response tracker (OxCGRT). https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/research/research-projects/oxford-covid-19-
government-response-tracker.
House, T., & Keeling, M. J. (2008). Deterministic epidemic models with explicit household structure. Mathematical Biosciences, 213(1), 29e39.
House, T., & Keeling, M. J. (2011). Epidemic prediction and control in clustered populations. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 272(1), 1e7.
Jack, S. (2020). Coronavirus: GSK and Sanofi join forces to create vaccine.
Kalbfleisch, J. D., & Lawless, J. F. (1991). Regression models for right truncated data with applications to AIDS incubation times and reporting lags. Statistica
Sinica, 19e32.
Keeling, M. J., & Rohani, P. (2011). Modeling infectious diseases in humans and animals. Princeton University Press.
Keju, W. (2019). China braces for world’s biggest travel rush around Spring Festival.
Kendall, D. G., et al. (1948). On the generalized ‘‘birth-and-death" process. The Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 19(1), 1e15.
Kermack, W. O., & McKendrick, A. G. (1927). A contribution to the mathematical theory of epidemics. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London - Series A:
Containing Papers of a Mathematical and Physical Character, 115(772), 700e721.
Kinyanjui, T., Middleton, J., Güttel, S., Cassell, J., Ross, J., & House, T. (2018). Scabies in residential care homes: Modelling, inference and interventions for
well-connected population sub-units. PLoS Computational Biology, 14(3), Article e1006046.
Kraemer, M. U. G., Yang, C., Gutierrez, B., Wu, C., Klein, B., Pigott, D. M., et al. (2020). The effect of human mobility and control measures on the covid-19
epidemic in China. Science, 368(6490), 493e497.
Lau, M. S. Y., Dalziel, B. D., Funk, S., McClelland, A., Tiffany, A., Riley, S., et al. (2017). Spatial and temporal dynamics of superspreading events in the 2014-
2015 West Africa Ebola epidemic. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 114(9), 2337e2342.
Lauer, S. A., Grantz, K. H., Bi, Q., Jones, F. K., Zheng, Q., Meredith, H., et al. (2020). The incubation period of 2019-nCoV from publicly reported confirmed cases:
Estimation and application. medRxiv.
Linton, N. M., Kobayashi, T., Yang, Y., Hayashi, K., Akhmetzhanov, A. R., Jung, S., et al. (2020). incubation period and other epidemiological characteristics of
2019 novel coronavirus infections with right truncation: A statistical analysis of publicly available case data. Journal of Clinical Medicine, 9(2), 538.
Lesko, J. K., Keil, A. P., & Edwards, J. K. (2020). The epidemiologic toolbox: Identifying, honing, and using the right tools for the job. American Journal of
Epidemiology, kwaa030.
Li, R., Pei, S., Chen, B., Song, Y., Zhang, T., Yang, W., et al. (2020). Substantial undocumented infection facilitates the rapid dissemination of novel coronavirus
(SARS-CoV2). Science, 368, 489e493.
Liu, Y., Gayle, A. A., Wilder-Smith, A., & Rockl€ov, J. (2020). The reproductive number of COVID-19 is higher compared to SARS coronavirus. Journal of Travel
Medicine, 27.
Magpantay, F. M. G., Riolo, M. A., Domenech de Celles, M., King, A. A., & Rohani, P. (2014). Epidemiological consequences of imperfect. SIAM Journal on
Applied Mathematics, 74(6), 1810e1830.
Mahase, E. (2020). China coronavirus: What do we know so far? BMJ, 368.
Majumder, M. S., & Mandl, K. D. (2020). Early in the epidemic: Impact of preprints on global discourse about COVID-19 transmissibility. The Lancet Global
Health, 8.
Mizumoto, K., Kagaya, K., Zarebski, A., & Chowell, G. (2020). Estimating the asymptomatic proportion of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) cases on board
the Diamond Princess cruise ship, Yokohama, Japan. Euro Surveillance, 25(10), 2000180, 2020.
Morris, H.. The largest human migration on the planet: What happens in China when 1.4bn go on holiday at the same time. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/
travel/news/chinese-new-year-chunyun-in-numbers/.
Mossong, J., Hens, N., Jit, M., Beutels, P., Auranen, K., Mikolajczyk, R., et al. (2008). Social contacts and mixing patterns relevant to the spread of infectious
diseases. PLoS Medicine, 5(3).
Nishiura, H. (2010). Time variations in the generation time of an infectious disease: Implications for sampling to appropriately quantify transmission
potential. Mathematical Biosciences and Engineering, 7(4), 851e869.
Nishiura, H., Kobayashi, T., Miyama, T., Suzuki, A., Jung, S., Hayashi, K., et al. (2020). Estimation of the asymptomatic ratio of novel coronavirus infections
(COVID-19). medRxiv.
Office for National Statistics. (2011). 2001 census aggregate data, Edition. May.
Office for National Statistics. (2019). Families and households, edition, 15 November https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/
birthsdeathsandmarriages/families/datasets/familiesandhouseholdsfamiliesandhouseholds.
Pellis, L., Ball, F., & Trapman, P. (2012). Reproduction numbers for epidemic models with households and other social structures. I. definition and calculation
of R0. Mathematical Biosciences, 235(1), 85e97.
Pellis, L., Cauchemez, S., Ferguson, N. M., & Fraser, C. (2020). Systematic selection between age and household structure for models aimed at emerging
epidemic predictions. Nature Communications, 11(1).
Pellis, L., Ferguson, N. M., & Fraser, C. (2011). Epidemic growth rate and household reproduction number in communities of households, schools and
workplaces. Journal of Mathematical Biology, 63(4), 691e734.
Pellis, L., Scarabel, F., Stage, H. B., Overton, C. E., Chappell, L. H. K., Lythgoe, K. A., et al. (2020). Challenges in control of covid-19: Short doubling time and long
delay to effect of interventions. arXiv.
Recorded daily case updates of covid-19 cases. Data scraped daily from 21-1-2020 to 3-2-2020 http://3g.dxy.cn/newh5/view/pneumonia.
Remuzzi, A., & Remuzzi, G. (2020). COVID-19 and Italy: What next? The Lancet, 395.
Rimmer, A. (2020). COVID-19: Disproportionate impact on ethnic minority healthcare workers will be explored by government. BMJ, 369.
Ross, R. (1910). The prevention of malaria. Dutton.
C.E. Overton et al. / Infectious Disease Modelling 5 (2020) 409e441 441Ross, J. V., House, T., & Keeling, M. J. (2010). Calculation of disease dynamics in a population of households. PloS One, 5(3), Article e9666.
Rubin, G. J., Amlôt, R., Page, L., & Wessely, S. (2009). Public perceptions, anxiety, and behaviour change in relation to the swine flu outbreak: Cross sectional
telephone survey. BMJ, 339, b2651.
Scalia Tomba, G., Svensson, Å., Asikainen, T., & Giesecke, J. (2010). Some model based considerations on observing generation times for communicable
diseases. Mathematical Biosciences, 223(1), 24e31.
Sellke, T. (1983). On the asymptotic distribution of the size of a stochastic epidemic. Journal of Applied Probability, 20(2), 390e394.
Shaw, L. M. (2016). SIR epidemics in a population of households. PhD thesis. University of Nottingham.
Sun, J. (1995). Empirical estimation of a distribution function with truncated and doubly interval-censored data and its application to AIDS studies. Bio-
metrics, 1096e1104.
Su, Y., & Wang, J. (2012). Modeling left-truncated and right-censored survival data with longitudinal covariates. Annals of Statistics, 40(3), 1465.
Sun, K., Chen, J., & Viboud, C. (2020). Early epidemiological analysis of the coronavirus disease 2019 outbreak based on crowdsourced data: A population-
level observational study. The Lancet Digital Health, 2.
Svensson, Å. (2007). A note on generation times in epidemic models. Mathematical Biosciences, 208(1), 300e311.
Taylor, D. J., Weaver, M. A., & Roddy, R. E. (2003). Evaluating factors associated with STD infection in a study with interval-censored event times and an
unknown proportion of participants not at risk for disease. Statistics in Medicine, 22(13), 2191e2204.
Valdano, E., Poletto, C., Boelle, P., & Colizza, V. (2019). Reorganization of nurse scheduling reduces the risk of healthcare associated infections. medRxiv.
Van Kerkhove, M. D., & Ferguson, N. M. (2012). Epidemic and intervention modelling: A scientific rationale for policy decisions? Lessons from the 2009
influenza pandemic. Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 90, 306e310.
Varia, M., Wilson, S., Sarwal, S., McGeer, A., Gournis, E., Galanis, E., et al. (2003). Investigation of a nosocomial outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) in Toronto, Canada. Canadian Medical Association Journal, 169(4), 285e292.
Virlogeux, V., Fang, V. J., Park, M., Wu, J. T., & Cowling, B. J. (2016). Comparison of incubation period distribution of human infections with MERS-CoV in
South Korea and Saudi Arabia. Scientific Reports, 6(1), 35839.
Wilder-Smith, A., Chiew, C. J., & Lee, V. J. (2020). Can we contain the COVID-19 outbreak with the same measures as for SARS? The Lancet Infectious Diseases,
20.
World Health Organisation. (2020). Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). Situation report - 69.
Wu, J. T., Leung, K., Bushman, M., Kishore, N., Niehus, R., de Salazar, P. M., et al. (2020). Estimating clinical severity of COVID-19 from the transmission
dynamics in Wuhan, China. Nature Medicine, 1e5.
Wu, Z., & McGoogan, J. M. (2020). Characteristics of and important lessons from the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak in China: Summary of a
report of 72 314 cases from the Chinese center for disease control and prevention. Jama, 323, 1239e1242.
Yang, J., Zheng, Y., Gou, X., Pu, K., Chen, Z., Guo, Q., et al. (2020). Prevalence of comorbidities in the novel Wuhan coronavirus (COVID-19) infection: A
systematic review and meta-analysis. International Journal of Infectious Diseases, 94.
Zhou, F., Yu, T., Du, R., Fan, G., Liu, Y., Liu, Z., et al. (2020). Clinical course and risk factors for mortality of adult inpatients with COVID-19 in Wuhan, China: A
retrospective cohort study. The Lancet, 395.
